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Latvian bank’s role in controversial Ukraine tenders under scrutiny

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Graham Stack in Kyiv for business new europe (www.bne.eu)

June 11, 2012

 

Questions are growing over the role played by Latvia’s Trasta Komercbanka in controversial Ukrainian state tenders in 2011 allegedly involving the embezzlement of hundreds of millions of dollars. According to bneenquiries and the tender documents viewed by bne, companies participating in the tenders were mere creatures of the Latvian bank, which has links to Ukrainian Minister of Energy Yury Boiko.
As bne previously reported, in March 2011 a UK shell company called Highway Investment Processing won a tender to supply a drilling rig for $400m to Chornomornaftogaz, which is a fully-owned subsidiary of national gas company Naftogaz Ukrainy. Norway’s offshore drilling giant Seadrill later confirmed that it originally supplied the rig to Highway but for only $248.5m, raising questions about the size of the intermediary’s mark-up, and who was the lucky beneficial owner of Highway.

In two parallel tenders in March 2011, a UK shell company registered at the same address as Highway Investment, Verylux Company, also with unknown beneficiaries, won contracts totalling over $150m to provide supply ships to the same Naftogaz subsidiary Chornomornaftogaz. Market analysts pointed to nearly 100% mark-ups for those deals. Naftogaz has disputed any irregularities in the tenders.

Adding to suspicions that the Naftogaz tenders were rigged, journalist investigations and tender documents show that all shell companies involved in the tenders – both winners and losers – had been set up by the same company service provider, International Overseas Services (IOS). A Ukrainian court, approving a police request to search IOS Kyiv offices in September 2011 in connection with a different money-laundering case, noted that IOS: “specializes in creating offshore companies registered under fictive persons for the purpose of tax minimization and transferring funds to offshore banks.”

According to the investigation cited, IOS is run for and by Latvia’s boutique banks – banks that mainly service clients from the former Soviet countries incorporated as offshore companies in the West. Thus, it was no surprise to discover that the winning company in the $400m tender for the drilling rig, Highway Investment, has its bank account at Latvia’s Trasta Komercbanka, the country’s 12th largest by assets, according to the tender documents and ensuing contract as seen by bne.

Distrusting Trasta

Remarkably, or perhaps not, the tender documents that have viewed by bne showed not only that the winner (Highway Investment) in the drilling rig tender had its bank account at Trasta Komercbanka, but that the runner-up in the same tender (New Zealand-registered Falcona Systems) also had a bank account at Trasta Komercbanka. Falcona was runner-up in a parallel tender for supply vessels as well. Ukrainian legislation requires a minimum of two bidders.

bne’s examination of the tender documents shows that Trasta Komercbanka’s involvement runs even deeper. The Falcona Systems tender documents specify that power of attorney over the company was held by a certain Raisa Mykolaivna Dziuba, with passport details provided. bne located and talked to Dziuba, who confirmed her passport details. But far from being an energy industry executive, Dziuba is a real estate agent in Kyiv employed by a minor player AESI International Development. She is currently trying to sell an office and parking space in the downtown “Diplomat Hall” development, as well as a suburban detached villa.

Asked about her connection with Falcona Systems, as evidenced by the tender documents, Dziuba answered simply: “I work for Trasta Komercbanka, I have a contract with them.” Dziuba confirmed in the framework of her relationship with Trasta Komercbanka she formally holds power of attorney for a number of companies established by Trasta Komercbanka clients. Dziuba, who does not speak English, showed no knowledge of Falcona Systems operations, nor of the Naftogaz tender bid, despite being named in the tender documents.

bne established independently one other company for which Dziuba apparently holds power of attorney: Panama-registered Fondberg Trading Inc. The company is listed on the website of a Kyiv travel agent Magic Travel as its “foreign partner”, with Dziuba as its director, and a bank account at Trasta Komercbanka. Dziuba said she had never heard of the company and had nothing to do with the tourism branch – except for frequent trips to Riga.

The findings may point to Dziuba’s power of attorney for Falcona Systems being fictive and organized by Trasta Komercbanka, which suggests that Falcona Systems is a creature of the bank itself.

The ultimate beneficiaries of companies that have nominee directors and shareholders, such as Highway Investment and Falcona, exercise ownership through their power of attorney. This document is crucial for banks and counterparties to establish the real beneficiaries of a company in order to comply with know-your-customer legislation. A fictive power of attorney is thus often a sign of foul play afoot. “Of course it is an illegal action,” Anna Dravniece, adviser to the chairman of Latvia’s Financial and Capital Market Commission, tells bne, referring to the creation of a fictive power of attorney. Even if it was solely the company’s initiative – doubtful in this case – the bank is obligated under anti-money laundering legislation to verify the data provided by customers, according to Dravniece.

The apparent inclusion of a fictive power of attorney in the Falcona tender documents could put into question the results of the tender in Ukraine – and all the more if the power of attorney specified for the $400m winning company, Highway Investment, was also shown to be fictive.

According to the tender documents, power of attorney for Highway Investment was held by a certain Pavel Dvulichanskii. None of the contracting parties with Highway Investment questioned by bne have ever reported dealings with anyone of that name. Lacking passport details, bne was not able to establish the identity of Dvulichanksii, who has no public profile, despite being technically responsible for deals measuring hundreds of millions of dollars.

Trasta Komercbanka said it could not comment on clients’ arrangements, but assured that the bank played no part in the Naftogaz tenders and connected deals. Highway Investment could not be reached under their advertised telephone number.

The Ukrainian connection

Trasta Komercbanka’s role in the controversial Chornomornaftogaz tenders is sensitive not just because of questions raised about the bank’s probity, but because of the strong links between Trasta Komercbanka and Ukraine’s energy minister, Yury Boiko, who masterminded the Naftogaz 2011 spending spree.

According to the Trasta Komercbanka website, owner of 43.2% of the bank and chairman of the board is Igors Buimisters, a native of the Ukrainian city of Kharkiv. According to his resume, Buimisters in the first half of the last decade worked in Ukraine as consultant to the management of Naftogaz, which was headed at that time by none other than Yury Boiko.

British citizen Charles Treherne, who holds a 9.3% stake in Trasta Komercbanka, according to the bank’s website, and sits on the supervisory board, also has links to energy minister Boiko via Ukrainian gas oligarch Dmitro Firtash. Treherne was deputy chairman of the supervisory board of Firtash’s Vienna-registered Centragas AG. Centragas is the ownership vehicle for Firtash’ 45% stake in the scandal-tainted gas trader Rosukrenergo.

Rosukrenergo until 2009 was Ukraine’s dominant private gas trader earning billions of dollars by supplying cheap gas from Turkmenistan to Ukraine, an arrangement established in 2004 when Boiko was head of Naftogaz. Leaked minutes of a Rosukrenergo shareholders meeting from 2004 appear to show Boiko nominated by Centragas to a founding Rosukrenergo shareholders’ meeting. Boiko has in the past denied ties to Rosukrenergo.

The cosy Rosukrenergo arrangement ended as a result of the January 2009 gas agreements between Naftogaz and Russia’s Gazprom, for which former prime minister Yulia Tymoshenko is currently serving a seven-year jail sentence for signing.

Ivan Fursin, with 5% in Rosukrenergo Firtash’s junior partner, has a 20-33% stake in Trasta Komercbanka, according to information at the Latvian financial regulator’s website.

Trasta Komercbanka’s links to Boiko, combined with its involvement in the controversial March 2011 Naftogaz tenders he masterminded, where journalists and opposition allege that over $200m went missing, reflect badly on the energy minister. But while questions have been raised in Ukraine over the conduct of the tenders, given the current constellation of power in Ukraine no law enforcement action is likely.

In Latvia, however, question marks continue to accumulate around Trasta Komercbanka. Apart from its involvement with the controversial Naftogaz tenders, at least two other cases raised eyebrows last year. In September 2011, asset retrieval proceedings by Kazakhstan’s BTA bank against its former owner Mukhtar Ablyazov at the High Court of London found that Ablyazov had diverted $1.5bn of BTA assets via offshore companies to accounts at Trasta Komercbanka, with a Belarusian farmer holding an apparently fictive power of attorney for the offshores involved. And a Ukrainian court in September 2011 found a small Dnipropetrovsk bank had shifted a total of $2bn out of the country via IOS-established companies to accounts at Trasta Komercbanka. “The bank controls all clients operations carefully in compliance with Anti Money Laundering Law. If the bank suspects or finds out that a client acts unlawfully, according to the law it notifies the national authority,” Trasta Komercbanka assured bne.

Latvia’s banking sector is still reeling from the 2011 collapse amid hundreds of millions of missing euros of the country’s 9th largest bank, Latvijas Krajbanka, and its Lithuanian parent bank Snoras, as a result of allegedly illegal activities of its owner Vladimir Antonov. The Krajbanka debacle raised urgent questions about whether Latvia’s regulators are up to the job of handling Russian and Ukrainian oligarchs’ shenanigans. Latvia can ill-afford a repeat performance.



Ukraine defence exporters come under fire for breach of UN arms sanctions

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Graham Stack in Kyiv for Business New Europe (www.bne.eu)

The UN has pinpointed defence exporters in the southeastern Ukrainian city of Zaporozhe as violating arms sanctions imposed on Eritrea, via a UK trading company, according to a bne source. If true, the allegations will add to Ukraine’s notoriety as a recurrent infringer of arms sanctions, and to the UK’s reputation as a no-questions-asked jurisdiction.

According to a bne source at the UN with knowledge of the matter, a UK company, Espace Soft Trading, linked to defence plants in Ukraine’s industrial hub of Zaporozhe is considered to have supplied defence technology and training to Eritrea in violation of UN sanctions. Espace Soft is believed to have overhauled the Eritrean Airforce’s Sukhoi fighter planes and providing training to pilots.

Eritrea is ranked internationally as one of the world’s worst dictatorships. The UN Security Council imposed sanctions in 2009 due to dictator Isaias Afawerki’s support for the Al-Shabab Islamist militants in neighbouring Somalia’s civil war.

Kyiv’s apparent failure to comply with international arms sanctions will heighten fears about the rule of law and state corruption in Ukraine. The unhindered use of UK shell firms to obscure traces of illegal arms deals will also add to criticism of the UK’s lax regulation of company registration.

According to bne’s UN source, Espace Soft’s operations in Eritrea were probably linked to Zaporozhe’s state-owned MIG Remont, Ukraine’s leading military aviation overhaul facility. The 2011 report on Eritrea from the UN sanctions committee already outlined suspicions of ongoing servicing of Eritrea’s Sukhoi jets by a MIG Remont team. Neither MIG Remont nor its parent company, state-owned defence holding Ukroboronprom responded tobne questions.

Yet bne has been able to confirm the Zaporozhe link for Espace Space. While most past and present company directors listed in the UK documents for Espace Space are nominees (ie. strawmen hiding the real owners), for one month in 2009, perhaps through a filing glitch, a certain Oleg Krasnoselskii of Zaporozhe features as director.

bne has established that Oleg Krasnoselskii is the son of Vitaly Krasnoselskii, the director and owner of the company Zaporozhe Foreign Trade Association (ZFTA). According to its public profile, ZFTA exports military aviation technology, including for MIG Remont, and aims “to boost regional exports to fully load Zaporozhe’s defence industry plants.” In 2005, the US imposed sanctions on ZFTA due to alleged dual-use exports to Iran, accusing Krasnoselskii of “assisting the Iranian missile program.”

Vitaly Krasnoselskii in comments to bne called Western-imposed sanctions “a legalised form of trade war”. But he denied any supplies of technology contravening UN sanctions.

Ukraine now seems set to be named yet again in a UN report on the sanctions violations. Most spectacularly, in 2009 Somalian pirates seized the Ukrainian-owned merchant vessel Faina – and found it to be stuffed with tanks, weapons and ammunitions bound for South Sudan.

for Motor Sich Fears 

The Espace Soft website says the company not only supplies aviation maintenance services, but has a sideline in gas turbine power units. This might indicate a link to Zaporozhe helicopter engine and turbine producer Motor Sich – Ukraine’s leading engineering company and also its most traded stock.

Krasnoselskii’s ZFRA previously listed Motor Sich as a partner company. But according to chairman of the Motor Sich advisory board Anatoly Malysh, Motor Sich has nothing to do with ZFRA or Espace Soft, although it admitted it knows of Krasnoselskii’s activities.

According to bne sources in the company, Motor Sich might, however, have links to a different murky UK trading company – Hazel (UK) Limited – which also trades with very risky states, especially Syria. Motor Sich does not acknowledge any links to Hazel (UK), which features nominee directors to obscure its beneficiaries.

According to documents seen by bne, in 2009 Hazel (UK) held a Ukrainian arms export licence for Syria. A US embassy cable published by the wikileaks website shows US diplomats battling in 2009 to stop Motor Sich overhauling 100 aircraft engines for the Syrian Air Force – with the US threatening “a review of the applicability of sanctions against the Ukrainian entities involved.” According to the leaked cable, the Ukrainian side insisted “there was no basis to oppose the overhaul of aircraft engines.”

In 2010, Ukraine’s security service then did seize a cargo of dual-use tyres at Zaporozhe airport, being shipped to Syria by Hazel (UK) on Motor Sich planes, according to court records. But as late as April this year, Motor Sich’s director of marketing Vladimir Shirkov in a press interview bemoaned the economic downturn in Syria resulting from the unrest, saying it was causing Syria to cancel orders.

If a connection to Hazel (UK) is established, the Syrian connection could yet have consequences for Motor Sich, due to the international crackdown on defence supplies to Syria’s brutal regime.

Ukraine’s UK corruption link

It is not just Ukraine that could be embarrassed by the upcoming UN report on Eritrean sanctions, but also the UK.

In 2009, Ukrainian diplomats provided the UK parliamentary committee on Arms Export Controls a list of UK-registered companies holding Ukrainian arms export licences – to the great surprise of the MPs. The committee concluded: “It is of serious concern that the UK Government was unaware of the existence of a list of UK brokers granted licences by the Ukraine,” and called authorities to “instigate an investigation.”

The list that so alarmed UK parliamentarians in 2009 included Espace Soft – now accused by the UN of supplying fighter jet servicing and parts to Eritrea’s dictator – as well as Hazel (UK), the supplier of helicopter parts to Syria. The list names other UK brassplates holding Ukrainian licences to supply military kit to Gaddafi’s Libya and nuclear technology to Lithuania, for example.

Three years later and apparently no measures have been taken against any of the companies – despite Espace Soft director Krasnoselskii’s prior record of being sanctioned by the US. According to a wikileaks US embassy cable dating from 2006, US diplomats warned Ukraine that Krasnoselskii’s ZRFA “is not a reputable firm and that just because it has not submitted an export license to your government does not mean it is not exporting items to Iran.” According to the leaked cable, Vitaly Krasnoselskii had met with a front company for Iran’s liquid-fuelled ballistic missile developer in 2005. In 2009, according to the leaked US cables, the US continued to express concerns to Ukraine about Krasnoselskii’s supplying speciality metals to Iran’s ballistic missile program. “It is possible that these activities were taking place without the knowledge of the Ukrainian government,” the cable reads.

Hazel (UK)’s apparently unhindered operations in UK, despite its Syrian links, also contrast with the UK’s recent very public measures to stop Russia shipping overhauled helicopters to Syria.

But the British embassy in Kyiv says that responsibility for such companies lies wholly with Ukraine. “The Ukrainian authorities are clearly aware of these companies, and we would expect the companies to be complying with Ukrainian export licensing laws,” second secretary political Jon Bateson tells bne. “The list… contained a number of brass plate companies, foreign companies that had registered as a UK company, but were not based in the UK, did no trade in the UK and were run by foreign nationals.”

The UK position seems to ignore a spate of recent publications – such as an “Idiot’s Guide to Money-Laundering” by anti-corruption NGO Global Witness in June – that point to the UK as a leading “secrecy jurisdiction” where foreign wrongdoers set up brassplate companies precisely for the purpose of hiding their tracks – as seems to be the case with Espace Soft and Hazel (UK). Where such “anonymous” companies also hold foreign weapon export licences, almost by definition they are up to no good.

One further jurisdiction may be implicated: The meat in the UK-Ukraine money-laundering sandwich has traditionally been provided by Latvia’s notorious banking system. Indications are that, in the case of Espace Soft, things may be no different: the company is registered at the same London address as a shell company, Diafall Limited, implicated in 2011 in a major corruption scandal in Ukraine’s state energy sector – where funds were processed by Latvia’s Trast Komercbanka. And Hazel (UK) features on the accounts of a money-laundering carousel company Tormex Limited, held at Latvia’s Baltic International Bank, with the company registered in New Zealand. Tormex Ltd was previously named in a US court case as having laundered money for Mexico’s feared Sinaloa cartel.


Halliburton gets drawn into Ukraine corruption scandal

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Graham Stack in Kyiv for Business New Europe (www.bne.eu)

Ukrainian national energy company Naftogaz Ukrainy claims an appraisal provided by oilfield services giant Halliburton justifies the $400m price tag that it paid for an offshore rig in 2011. But a bne investigation finds the Halliburton appraisal, Halliburton_20111117 is less than meets the eye, as the US firm subcontracted rig appraisal work to a one-man band from Alabama.

In 2011, Ukraine’s national energy company Naftogaz purchased an offshore drilling rig for just under $400m from a UK intermediary company, which previously had acquired the same rig for just $248.5m from Norway’s offshore operator Seadrill. The discrepancy between the prices prompted widespread accusations of corruption on a grand scale, which coming just as Ukraine’s election campaign for parliamentary elections set for October 28 got underway could be a key factor in determining the outcome.

In a fightback against the allegations, Naftogaz and energy minister officials are now claiming that a valuation of the rig performed by Halliburton confirms the $400m price tag, exonerating them from suspicion.

According to the Halliburton letter summarizing the preliminary appraisal results, seen by bne, Halliburton_20111117 the estimated value of the rig, outfitting and engineering work, and transport needed to move it from Singapore to the Black Sea almost exactly matches the sum of $400m paid by Naftogaz at the controversial procurement tender held in March 2011. The winner of the tender was a UK company called Highway Investment Processing, the beneficiaries and representatives of which have never been revealed. The bank account to which the funds were transferred was with Latvian bank Trasta Komercbanka.

Naftogaz management and energy ministry officials are now brandishing the Halliburton appraisal letter as proof that the acquisition of the rig was above board. “The procedure of purchasing the drilling platform, its servicing and technological processes are all subject to an independent audit from Halliburton,” Naftogaz deputy board chairman Vadim Chuprun declared.

Ukraine’s energy ministry claimed: “We believe further insinuations about the purchase of the drilling rigs are an instrument of competition for the development of the Black Sea shelf aimed at reducing Ukraine’s energy security.”

Sweet home Alabama

The Halliburton letter subsequently produced by Naftogaz is written in poor English and contains orthographical and factual errors, but Halliburton confirmed to bne it was authentic.

The letter may not, however, fulfill the expectations placed on it by Naftogaz. It states that Halliburton in fact subcontracted rig appraisal work to a company called Marine Surveyors Incorporated, which deployed a team led by a certain Captain Michael Barrie. According to bne enquiries, the Halliburton letter is misleading in that there is no such company as Marine Surveyors Incorporated – the company Halliburton hired is Captain Michael Barrie’s own set-up: M. H. Barrie & Associates Marine Surveyors, Inc. And according to Barrie, he travelled alone to a Turkish Black Sea port for the rig appraisal job.

According to bne enquiries, Captain Barrie’s marine surveyor company is a small local affair based in the US southern port town of Mobile, Alabama, operating since 1994, with Barrie taking on some partners in 1998. Barrie operates from a four-room suite in a dockside office block, with total staff numbering under 10. According to his website, Captain Barrie offers “marine and terminal expertise” with “local knowledge of port operations.” A marine surveyors’ role is to assess vessel and cargo condition mostly for insurance purposes and damage claims.

Barrie’s website does not mention any expertise in offshore energy. Barrie told bne that over the last two years he had indeed taken on some work with jack-up rigs and said that his website is seven years old and needs updating. Barrie acknowledged that his is a “small company” and that this was the first job he had done for Halliburton. Barrie said that Halliburton had refused him permission to comment to bne on any aspects of the appraisal, but indicated he was unacquainted with the appraisal letter’s contents.

Halliburton is the world’s second largest oilfield services company, with a market capitalization of $30bn and workforce of over 60,000, headed in the 1990s by the later US vice president Dick Cheney. The Halliburton press service intended to get back to bne with answers on the appraisal of the “West Juno” rig (now renamed “Petro Godovanets”), but failed to do so within a two week deadline.

While the reasons for Barrie’s hiring by Halliburton are unclear, the import of the appraisal letter so feted by Ukrainian officials is equally unclear: the bulk of the difference between the $248.5m sale price to Norway’s Seadrill paid by the UK intermediary, and the $400m purchase price paid by Naftogaz to the UK intermediary, is explained in two lines, both of which refer to data supplied by Naftogaz itself. Thus, according to the letter, “based on the activities information provided by Naftogaz (sic) upgrades to the West Juno rig is (sic) estimated at $57,940,000.”

Secondly, “based on the work volume before rig dry tow requested by Naftogaz, auxiliary costs for engineering work such as cut and reinstall the legs, personnel and engineering is (sic) estimated at $71,380,000.” This item refers to work done on the rig necessary to move it through the Bosporus into the Black Sea. Notably, the Halliburton letter dated November 2011 was actually written before the engineering work was implemented in the winter 2011-2012, with Barrie visiting in April 2012.

Naftogaz did not respond to bne queries about the extent to which the Halliburton appraisal was based on data supplied by Naftogaz itself.

Interestingly, the original contract signed in March 2011 between Naftogaz and UK intermediary Highway Investment, as seen by bne, specified Singapore as place of delivery, not the Black Sea. Thus the price items connected to transit via the Bosporus – $71,280,000 – and also shipping costs of $15m were not included in the original deal between Naftogaz and Highway Investment of March 2011. The place of delivery was shifted from Singapore to the Turkish Black Sea port of Giresun in amendments to the contract made in September 2011, seen by bne. The changes apparently at a stroke of the pen brought over $86m extra expense for Highway Investment, but without any change in the price paid by Naftogaz.

September 2011 was also the month Halliburton signed a framework agreement with Naftogaz on construction, operating and maintaining of oil and gas wells, including an option for servicing the West Juno/Petro Godovanets rig. This agreement sealed what had been a meteoric rise for Halliburton in Ukraine in 2011, with prior agreements in the course of the year signed on confidentiality and cooperation, and Halliburton opening a swanky new office in the prestigious heart of Kyiv. The November 2011 Halliburton appraisal letter thus finishes on a high note: “Halliburton appreciates this opportunity to submit this preliminary report and looks forward to being Naftogaz business partner in developing oil and gas assets in Ukraine.”

Analysts surmise that Halliburton has now supplanted Schlumberger as Naftogaz’s service partner of choice: as early as 2006, Schlumberger, the world’s largest oilfield services company and Halliburton’s traditional rival, signed a strategic cooperation agreement with Naftogaz, and as late as December 2010 Schlumberger won a Naftogaz tender for work on the Subbotinskoe offshore field. Schlumberger told bne, “we cannot confirm their [the previous agreements'] continuing validity.”

Rewriting history

History is being rewritten not only in Ukraine with respect to the 2011 Naftogaz rig deals. The revenues from the sale of the West Juno rig to Naftogaz went through Highway Investment’s account at Latvia’s Trasta Komercbanka – a bank that appears to have links to Naftogaz Ukraine. Not the least of such links would be the fact that largest shareholder and chairman of the bank’s council, Igor Buimisters, listed on his website biography that he is consultant to the supervisory boards of “Neftgas Ukraine” and also of a Naftogaz joint venture with Poland’s PGNiG called Devon. Neftgas Ukraine is a russified version of Naftogaz Ukrainy.

But Trasta has now removed the reference to the Ukrainian companies from Buimisters’ bio. Following the deletion, the bank demanded that bne retract its previous statements linking Buimisters to Naftogaz.

The bank also now claims in hindsight that the reference to “Neftgas Ukraine” never in fact referred to Naftogaz Ukrainy, but to an unspecified privately held company. The bank does not dispute Buimisters’ involvement with the Naftogaz joint venture ‘Devon’. Despite bne requests, the bank has not supplied the address or registration details of the “real” Neftgas Ukraine. Nor does the Interfax Spark database contain details of any such company.  But the website bio has generously retained reference to Buimisters’ “doctorate” from Kennedy Western University – an unaccredited US distance-learning college that closed in 2009 after being named in a US government investigation into “diploma mills.”

The bank’s apparent nervousness comes at a time when Latvian law enforcement agencies are finally making moves to investigate the 2011 Naftogaz tenders and the subsequent passage of money through Latvia. bne has obtained confirmation from the economic crime department of the Latvian state police that an investigation is ongoing, following transfer of materials earlier this year from the state prosecutor’s anti-money laundering office.

Sad end to tenders

While there appears no end in sight to the controversy over the 2011 Naftogaz Black Sea tenders, in Ukraine an end has been made to the law on compulsory tenders for state companies, which has provided so much help to journalists and so much hindrance to bureaucrats. Without the law, the 2011 Naftogaz spending spree – which totalled roughly $1bn for two jack-up rigs and support vessels – would never have come to public attention.

President Viktor Yanukovych, under whose watch the Naftogaz tenders took place in 2011, signed into law August 1 amendments to the procedure for state procurement, freeing state-owned companies such as Naftogaz from holding such mandatory procurement tenders – and thus effectively eliminating any form of public control over vast swathes of the state sector. The government argues that compulsory tenders slow the procurement process and impede state companies’ international competitiveness.

According to Oleksiy Shalaisky, founder of the Nashi Groshi website that monitors state tenders for signs of corruption – and who first flagged up the Naftogaz Black Sea tenders in 2011 – this will decimate the number of state tenders held. “State-owned companies account for around UAH300bn ($37bn) of a total UAH500bn ($62bn) state procurement orders,” Shalaisky tells bne. “These will now be excluded from having to hold tenders, and we calculate that the level of minimum kickback will rise to 10%, meaning at least an extra UAH30bn ($3.7bn) will be stolen.”

According to Shalaisky, the Nashi Groshi website in little over a year’s work achieved the cancellation of 25 tenders, resulting in over $700m being be returned to the exchequer. “All of these tenders were cancelled exclusively due to pressure from the media. There were no legal faults found in the tender procedure, but following media pressure, the tender winners themselves stepped back from the deals.”

The media pressure was heightened by independent critical TV station TVi, which runs a feature “Tender News” focusing on corruption suspicions, including the Naftogaz Black Sea tenders. In mid-July, authorities seemed to fire a warning shot across the bows of TVi, launching a criminal case against its CEO on tax evasion charges. The charges were officially declared dropped on August 2 – a day after the changes to the tender laws.

Following the elimination of mandatory tenders, Shalaisky now expects a further surge in corruption: “The most corrupt deals were put on hold pending the recent amendments to the law.”


Суд США может сорвать оружейную сделку Украины с Ираком

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Graham Stack for Business New Europe (www.bne.eu) in Berlin

Приговор суда Сан-Антонио (Западный Техас, США) грозит контракту на поставку оружия из Украины в Ирак на $560 млн. Подписанное в 2009 году соглашение могло бы возродить оборонную промышленность Украины.

 

Детали сделки только проясняются, но BNE известно, что в июне суд Сан-Антонио наградил техасского бизнесмена Говарда Лоури (Howard Lowry) колоссальной компенсацией в $61,75 млн от украинско-американских брокеров, которые исключили его из соглашения 2009 года. Судебное разбирательство, по всей видимости, вызвано конфликтом между украинскими и иракскими чиновниками (бывшими и действующими), которые не могут поделить комиссии от контракта.

 

Иск в суд Сан-Антонио подал Говард Лоури, американский бизнесмен, который работал в Ираке после американской оккупации в 2003 году в качестве посредника американских компаний и выискивал подряды иракских властей. Лоури выиграл суд у Олега Янковича (Oleg Jankovic), владельца компании Jankovic&Associates из Вашингтона, которая лоббировала украинские интересы в столице США. Янкович считается близким к Джиму Веббу, сенатору-демократу от штата Вирджиния. Он также играл ключевую роль в сделке 2009 года между украинскими экспортерами оружия и иракскими чиновниками, и получил за это комиссионные платежи.

Но согласно иску, Лоури из Багдада фактически инициировал первые встречи между украинскими представителями, Янковичем и иракскими официальными лицами. У Лоури есть письменный договор с Янковичем на 50% комиссионных от последующих контрактов. Но когда весь масштаб сделки стал ясен в 2009 году, Янкович, при поддержке своих украинских клиентов – государственной экспортной оружейной компании «Прогресс», вычеркнул из соглашения Лоури.

 

В результате суд Сан-Антонио наградил Лоури захватывающей суммой $61,5 млн, которую должен выплатить Янкович. Колоссальные деньги вряд ли будут перечислены в полном объеме, так как, похоже, только $112 млн от общей стоимости сделки были переданы Ираком на сегодняшний день. Но Лоури охотится за всей суммой. «Мой клиент имеет письменный договор, который дает ему право на долю комиссионных платежей от сделки, а также пункт, который предусматривает разрешение споров в международном арбитражном суде в Стокгольме», – рассказал BNE Давид Причард (David Prichard), адвокат Лоури.

Очевидно, что возобновление платежей по контракту в 2012 году снова вызовет судебную битву.

 

Осведомитель

Когда Киев и Багдад объявили в октябре 2009 года, что Ирак купит 420 бронемашин БТР-4 и шесть транспортных самолетов АН-32b на общую сумму $560 млн, казалось, что оборонный сектор Украины снова вернул себе былую славу советских дней. Были даже разговоры, что это лишь первая сделка, а потенциал партнерства стоит $2,5 млрд, ведь Ирак хочет восстановить свою обороноспособность.

Но эта сделка не спасла администрацию президента Украины Виктора Ющенко от позорных 5% на выборах в начале 2010 года. Как только новая администрация во главе с президентом Виктором Януковичем пришла к власти, все руководство оборонного сектора было заменено, а по сделке с Ираком начались сложности. После того как первую поставку из 26 бронемашин Украина сделала с опозданием в 2011 году, иракские власти отказались принимать вторую партию из 62 БТРов. Формальной причиной были технические дефекты, выявленные повторной проверкой машин в Украине, писали СМИ. Украинские чиновники регулярно объявляли о планах по отправке бронетехники в Ирак, но этого так и не произошло.

 

По словам источника, который работал в оборонном ведомстве при прежней администрации, реальной причиной отказа иракских чиновников принять вторую партию бронетехники было то, что новое руководство Украины отказывается выплачивать комиссионные платежи по схеме, утвержденной в 2009 году.

Но в июне ситуация разрешилась. После очередной проверки иракцами вторая партия из 62 БТР-4 в Харькове была одобрена. Хотя в «Укрспецэкспорте» не смогли сообщить BNE об отправке бронемашин, это говорит о некоем компромиссе между бывшими и нынешними чиновниками из Ирака и Украины. В целом комиссионные платежи с обеих сторон достигают около 20%, что составляет примерно $100 млн, исходя из совокупной суммы контракта.

Но как только чиновники договорились, Говард Лоури испортил им всю малину своей победой в суде.

У Лоури в США уже есть имидж осведомителя прессы. В 2011 году он сообщил прессе непристойные детали об интересе американской частной охранной компании Blackwater к автоматам АК-47, кокаину, стероидам и случайному насилию в Ираке. Теперь Лоури взялся за украинский оборонный сектор и его лоббистов.

Согласно иску, Лоури лично организовал первые контакты между иракскими чиновниками в Багдаде и украинских посредников Янковича из Вашингтона и его коллеги Николая “Ника” Каранько (Mykola Karanko) из Киева. Лоури подписал соглашение с Янковичем в 2008 году о передаче ему 50% доли от любых комиссионных платежей по будущей сделке. Но после первого контакта с иракцами, Янкович исключил его из сделки полностью, в соответствии с данными суда.

ФОТО Николай “Ник” Каранько

Детали разбирательства подтверждают информацию, что у иракских чиновников была сильная личная заинтересованность в сделке в ее первоначальном виде (при администрации Ющенко). По документам, с которыми ознакомился BNE, украинский экспортер оружия «Прогресс» в 2009 году согласился заплатить 8% комиссионных платежей от суммы контракта.

 

Деньги перечисляются через Николая Каранько таким гражданам Ирака и компаниям:

- Mohammaed Jasem Midnf Al Kaabi,

- Ahmad Mohammed Al Saady,

- Haider M. Salih Shnawa Al-Musaied,

- Al Khairat Al Arabia Co.,

- Wahi Al Abdaa Co.

 

Платежи поступали в пользу членов президентской комиссии Ирака по оборонным закупкам, согласно материалам дела. В просочившихся через Wikileaks дипломатических сообщениях посольства США в Багдаде выражалась «обеспокоенность по поводу коррупции» в сделке с Украиной, а также упоминалось, что около 50% расходов на оборону Ирака были профинансированы США.

Суду давал свидетельские показания и бывший заместитель главы компании «Прогресс» Владимир Владимиров. Документы суда говорят, что Янкович и Каранько также организовали комиссионные выплаты от «Прогресса» в противоположном направлении: к украинским «лоббистам».

 

«Прогресс» согласился платить комиссионные компании Каранько из Делавера Universal Investment Group (UIG). «Прогресс» перечислила все комиссии UIG по авансовому платежу Ирака по сделке. Дальше деньги были перечислены на три оффшорные компании-пустышки, которые якобы выступали субподрядчиками-«лоббистами» по соглашению от 20 августа 2009 года. Стенограмма заседания суда приводит слова адвоката Лоури, Причарда, о том, что «компании использовались для передачи взяток украинским чиновникам». Суд распорядился не раскрывать личности владельцев этих компаний из-за того, что эта информация крайне чувствительна.

Анонимный источник BNE в Берлине подтвердил платежи украинцев. По его словам, UIG получила примерно $12 млн комиссии по иракскому авансовому платежу в размере $112 млн, и заплатили чуть менее $10 млн оффшорным компаниям. Эта сумма была разбита на примерно три равные части и поступила на счета «лоббистов»:

- сингапурской UST-Tech Consulting,

- зарегистрированной на Британских Виргинских островах Hectorian Services,

- британская Lanefield Exports.

 

Lanefield Exports в то время формально принадлежала компаниям из Белиза Milltown Corporate Services и Ireland&Overseas Acquisition. А уже эти компании были уличены журналистами в связи с латвийскими банками, которые помогали коррупционерам из Украины отмывать преступные деньги. В том числе и от поставок бронетанковой техники в Южный Судан в 2009 году на судне «Фаина», которое было захвачено пиратами (по версии украинских чиновников груз предназначался для Кении, – LB.ua).

 

По данным источников BNE, Каранько, владелец UIG, связан с экс-главой «Прогресса» Тарасом Шийко. Каранько – один из 41 друзей Шийко на Facebook. Он попал в этот бизнес сперва как руководитель агентства переводов, которое в том числе обслуживало клиентов из оборонного сектора.

По данным BNE, сам Шийко – ставленник Сергея Бондарчука, который руководил материнской компанией «Прогресса» – компанией «Укрспецэкспорт» все время президентства Виктора Ющенко с 2005 по 2010 годы. В последние дни президентства Ющенко наградил Бондарчука «Героем Украины» – высшей государственной наградой. Каранько не отвечает на просьбы BNE по электронной почте прокомментировать решение суда. В компании Jankovic&Associates отказались обсуждать решение суда с BNE по телефону.

Лоури говорит о себе, что сейчас он – безработный в Сан-Антонио, что он испытывает стресс после возвращения из Ирака и считает свою победу справедливой компенсацией. «После того как я связался с этой группой, я получил более 30 смертельных угроз», – сказал он BNE.

 

«Моя вторая работа – умение оказаться в самых опасных районах Багдада, чтобы получить сведения, которые не смогли получить военные», – пишет Лоури в своем профиле в LinkedIn.

 

«Таким образом, я узнал обо всем, что только один человек может сделать с другим… К сожалению, как частный гражданский, я был лишен моей медстраховки, и не могу найти психотерапевта, который бы видел что-то больше, чем последствия ДТП».

Кто такой Саламатин?

Между тем, возвращаясь к украинским делам, срыв оружейного контракта затмевает происходящую сейчас коренную централизацию системы экспорта оружия. Раньше она была беспорядочной. Однако централизация вряд ли сделает систему более прозрачной, утверждают критики.

Финансы Украины уже находятся под централизованным контролем темной фигуры 34-летнего главы Нацбанка Сергея Арбузова. В течение нескольких месяцев он вырос из неизвестного регионального менеджера до высшей должности в государственных финансах. Суд освободил его от персонального ID-номера «по религиозным соображениям».

 

Оборонный сектор также концентрируется вокруг такой же темной фигуры министра обороны Дмитрия Саламатина. Его карьера началась в шахтах Казахстана. По слухам он является зятем Олега Сосковца, который в 1990-е занимал пост вице-премьер-министра России. Саламатин принял украинское гражданство только в 2005 году, в возрасте 40-а лет, чтобы быть избранным в парламент страны годом позже. И только в апреле 2010 года он окажется ньюсмейкером в политике – как агрессор, а не защитник – бросаясь вперед со стульями и размахивая кулаками, чтобы поранить нескольких оппозиционных депутатов во время крупной ссоры в парламенте.

Через несколько дней после демонстрации своего боевого мастерства на практике, Саламатин был назначен руководителем материнской компании по экспорту украинских вооружений «Укрспецэкспорт». Саламатин сразу же принялся за централизацию, перекладывая на «Укрспецэкспорт» прямую ответственность за все контракты ее дочерних компаний, таких как «Прогресс», в том числе и по договору в Ираке. Затем Саламатин успешно лоббировал создание государственного оборонного холдинга «Укроборонпром», который теперь контролирует все 118 оборонных заводов, а также все экспортные структуры. Он быстро возглавил новую монструозную структуру, пока не был назначен в феврале 2012 года министром обороны Украины. Спустя всего семь лет после замены российского паспорта на украинский.

Критики обвиняют его в работе на Россию, в «саботаже» иракского контракта. Но нет никаких признаков того, что Россия атаковала эту сделку. Стратегия, которую использует Саламатин в оборонном ведомстве, действительно похожа на ту, что использовал Владимир Путин в России в 2004 году. Это централизация продаж и производственных структур в холдингах, которые непосредственно подчинены исполнительной власти.

Однако, в отличие от России, оборонный сектор Украины гораздо больше зависим от зарубежных продаж. Расходы безденежной Украины на закупку вооружений близки к нулю. Но все может измениться. Беспорядки вспыхивают на ключевых для Украины рынках на Ближнем Востоке в 2011 и в 2012 годах. Проблемы с иракским договором подрывают надежды Украины на быстрый рост экспорта вооружений. Во время назначения Саламатина министром в феврале было объявлено, что производство должно удвоиться до 2017 года. Теперь Украина, возможно, последует примеру Путина и увеличит расходы на оборону.


US court case poses new threat to huge Ukraine-Iraq arms deal

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Graham Stack in Berlin for Business New Europe (www.bne.eu)
August 30, 2012

A verdict in a lawsuit in San Antonio, West Texas, has put yet another question mark over a controversial $560m Ukraine-Iraq arms deal, hailed at the time of its signing in 2009 as one that would resurrect Ukraine’s ailing defence industry.

The details are only emerging now, but bne can reveal that a San Antonio jury awarded Texan businessman Howard Lowry in June a whopping $61.75m damages against the Ukraine-US brokers who set up the 2009 deal for cutting him out of it. The court case seems likely to retrigger behind-the-scenes conflicts between Iraqi and Ukraine officials, old and new, over who will earn commissions on the contract.

The San Antonio lawsuit was brought by Howard Lowry, a US businessman who worked in Iraq following the US occupation in 2003 as a middleman for US companies looking to land orders from Iraqi authorities. Lowry sued and won against Oleg Jankovic, owner of Washington DC-based company Jankovic & Associates, an established lobbyist and intermediary for Ukrainian interests in Washington D.C. Jankovic, who is regarded as close to Democrat senator for Virginia Jim Webb, played a key role in facilitating the 2009 deal between Ukrainian defence exporters and Iraqi officials, and received commission payments for doing so.

But according to the lawsuit, it was Baghdad-based Lowry who actually set up the initial meetings between Ukrainian representatives, Jankovic and Iraqi officials. Lowry holds a written contract with Jankovic entitling him to 50% of commissions earned by Jankovic on ensuing contracts. But when the full scale of the pending deal became clear in 2009, Jankovic, with the backing of his Ukrainian client, the state-owned arms export company Progres, cut Lowry out of it.

As a result, the San Antonio court has now made Lowry a breathtaking award of $61.5m damages against Jankovic. The colossal sum is unlikely to be paid in full, as apparently only $112m of the deal’s total price has been transferred by Iraq to date. But Lowry is gunning for as much as he can get in the future “My client has a written contract that entitles him to a share of commissions on payments deriving from the deal, and a clause that stipulates Stockholm as place of international arbitrage,” David Prichard, Lowry’s attorney, tells bne.

With the apparent resumption of payments on the contract in 2012, the scene is now set for protracted court battles.

The whistleblower

When Kyiv and Baghdad announced in October 2009 that Iraq would purchase 420 BTR-4 armoured vehicles and 6 An-32b transport planes from Ukraine, worth a total of $560m, it seemed Ukraine’s defence sector was finally recapturing its Soviet-era glory days. There was even speculation the deal would be only the first in a total potential partnership worth $2.5bn to Ukraine, as Iraq sought to rebuild its defence capacity.

But the deal was not enough to rescue the administration of Viktor Yushchenko from ignominy at the polls in early 2010, with Yushchenko taking a miserly 5% in the presidential elections. As soon as the new administration under President Viktor Yanukovych came to power, there was a wholesale replacing of defence sector management and the Iraq deal hit the rocks. Following initial delivery of 26 vehicles after delays in 2011, Iraq officials refused to accept the second batch of 62 vehicles due to technical defects revealed on reinspection in Ukraine 2011-12, according to media reports. Ukraine officials regularly announced imminent shipping of the armoured vehicles, but it never happened.

According to former defence officials from the previous administration, fighting a rearguard action via media, the real reason for Iraqi officials’ refusal to accept the second batch of armoured vehicles was that Ukraine’s new leadership were refusing to pay out “commissions” to Iraqi officials under a scheme agreed in 2009.

But in June it seemed there had been a breakthrough, with Iraqi officials inspecting and accepting the second batch of 62 BTR-4s in Kharkiv, although bne could not get confirmation from Ukrspetseksport as to whether it had shipped. This indicated some compromise had been reached regarding the commissions between Iraqi officials and the old and new Ukraine officials. Total commissions to both sides are put at around 20%, which is potentially worth around $100m over the course of the entire contract.

But just as the going got smoother, Howard Lowry has now upset the apple cart with his courtroom victory.

Lowry had already made a name for himself as whistleblower in 2011 when he passed to the US media salacious details of notorious US private security contractor Blackwater’s appetite for AK-47s, cocaine, steroids and random violence in Iraq. Now he has turned on Ukraine’s defence sector and lobbyists.

According to Lowry’s successful lawsuit, he personally organised the initial contacts with Iraqi officials in Baghdad for the Ukrainian intermediaries, Jankovic in Washington DC and his colleague, Mykola “Nick” Karanko from Kyiv. Lowry signed an agreement with Jankovic in 2008 assigning him a 50% share in commissions for any help in closing a deal. But after the initial contact to the Iraqis, Jankovic cut him out of the deal entirely, according to the court.

Backhanders on all sides

The details of the court case confirm reports that Iraqi officials had a strong personal interest in the deal going ahead in its original form, as negotiated under the Yushchenko administration. According to court documents seen by bne, Ukrainian arms exporter Progres in 2009 arranged to pay commissions via Mykola Karanko totalling around 8% of the contract sum, to Iraqi citizens Mohammaed Jasem Midnf Al Kaabi, Ahmad Mohammed Al Saady and Haider M. Salih Shnawa Al-Musaied, and to Iraqi companies Al Khairat Al Arabia Co. and Wahi Al Abdaa Co. The payments were for the benefit of members of Iraq’s presidential defence procurement commission, according to the court case. A leaked diplomatic cable from the US embassy in Bagdad expressed “concern about corruption” regarding the Ukraine deal, reminding that nearly 50% of Iraq’s defence expenditure was funded directly by the US.

The US court case, at which Progres’ former deputy head Volodymyr Vladimirov testified, also tellingly revealed that Jankovic and Karanko organised commission payments from Progres in the opposite direction: to Ukrainian “lobbyists”. The court documents record that Progres agreed to pay commissions to Karanko’s Delaware company, Universal Investment Group (UIG). Almost all of the commission payment to UIG made by Progres on the initial down-payment by Iraq was immediately forwarded by UIG to three Ukrainian-owned shell companies, ostensibly for their subcontracted activity as “lobbyists,” under an agreement dated August 20, 2009. The court transcript records Lowry’s attorney Prichard calling the shell companies “fronts for these Ukrainian officials to get bribes.” The defendants obtained a court order preventing disclosure of the identities of the Ukrainian owners of these companies, claiming the information was highly sensitive, according to court records.

A bne source who prefers to remain anonymous, interviewed in Berlin, confirmed the payments to the Ukrainians. According to the source, UIG received a roughly $12m commission payment on the Iraqi down-payment of $112m, and paid just under $10m of this in three roughly equal portions to the Ukraine-owned offshore “lobbyists” – Singapore company UST-Tech Consulting, British Virgin Isles company Hectorian Services and UK company Lanefield Exports. Lanefield Exports at the time was formally owned by Belize companies Milltown Corporate Services and Ireland & Overseas Acquisitions, which media investigations have established are controlled by Latvian money-laundering banks, and are associated with numerous Ukraine corruption cases, including the shipment to South Sudan of armoured vehicles in 2009 on the MS Faina that was hijacked by Somali pirates.

According to bne sources, Karanko, the owner of UIG, is an associate of the former head of arms export company Progres, Taras Shiiko. Karanko, one of Shiiko’s 41 Facebook friends, got his start in business running a translation business in Kyiv, reportedly taking on defence sector orders.

According to bne enquiries, Shiiko himself was seen as a placeman of Serhiy Bondarchuk, head of Progres parent company Ukrspetseksport throughout the presidency of Viktor Yushchenko 2005-10. Yushchenko made Bondarchuk a “Hero of Ukraine”, the highest state decoration, in the dying days of his presidency. Karanko did not respond to email requests to comment on the court verdict. Jankovic & Associates refused to discuss the case with bne over the phone.

Lowry himself says he is now unemployed in San Antonio, suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder after his return from Iraq, and regards his mega-win as fair compensation. “Since becoming involved with the group, I have received more than 30 death threats,” he tells bne.

“My other job involved going into some of the most dangerous areas in Baghdad in order to obtain intelligence that the military could not,” he also writes in his Linkedin profile. “As such, the ‘proving’ initiations were beyond anything I could imagine that one human being would do to another… Unfortunately, as a private civilian, I have been dumped from my health insurance carrier, and can’t find a shrink that has seen nothing greater than a car wreck.”

Who is Mr Salamatin?

Meanwhile back in Ukraine, the derailed arms deal is overshadowing ongoing root-and-branch centralisation of Ukraine’s previously sprawling and shambolic arms export system. But centralisation is unlikely to bring more transparency, argue critics.

Just as Ukraine’s state finances are being centralised round the shadowy figure of 34-year-old national bank head Serhiy Arbuzov – who rose from regional obscurity to the top financial post in a matter of months, and acknowledges a court has exempted him from holding a personal tax ID “on religious grounds” – Ukraine’s defence sector is centralised around the equally shadowy figure of Defence Minister Dmitro Salamatin. Salamatin, whose career started in the mines of Kazakhstan, and who is rumoured to be the son-in-law of 1990s Russian Deputy Prime Minister Oleg Soskovets, only took Ukraine citizenship in 2005, at the age of 40, in order to enter the country’s parliament in 2006. And only in April 2010 did he make headlines in politics – in an offence rather than defence role – leading a charge with chairs and fists that injured opposition MPs during a major parliamentary bust-up.

Days after proving his martial prowess in hands-on fashion, Salamatin was made head of the parent arms export agency Ukrspetseksport. Salamatin immediately moved to centralise the organisation, with Ukrspetseksport assuming direct responsibility for implementing all contracts handled by its subsidiaries such as Progres, including the Iraq contract. Salamatin then successfully lobbied the establishment of a state defence sector holding Ukroboronprom, which now controls all 118 defence production plants as well as all export structures. Salamatin promptly moved to head the new monster holding in 2011, until in February 2012 he was made Ukraine’s defence minister – only seven years after swapping Russian for Ukrainian citizenship.

Critics have accused him of acting in Russian interests in “sabotaging” the Iraq contract, but there is no indication that Russia has swooped to steal the deal. But Salamatin’s strategy for the sector indeed mirrors that launched by Russia’s Vladimir Putin in 2004, in centralising both sales and production structures in holdings directly subordinated to the executive.

In contrast to Russia, however, Ukraine’s defence producers are far more reliant on foreign sales, since cash-strapped Ukraine’s expenditure on arms procurement is close to zero. But that could change: The turmoil breaking out across Ukraine’s key export markets in the Middle East in 2011 and continuing in 2012, along with the threats to the Iraq contract, have undermined hopes for a rapid boost to arms exports. With Salamatin’s move to the defence ministry in February putting him direct charge of procurement, and plans announced that defence production should double through 2017, Ukraine may now be set for a Putin-style hike in defence spending.


Down and murky in Ukraine as opposition candidate arrested

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Graham Stack in Kyiv for Business New Europe (www.bne.eu)

October 6, 2012

 

The arrest of opposition parliamentary candidate and financier Ruslan Demchak on money-laundering charges looks at first glance to be another example of mounting political repression ahead of Ukraine’s parliamentary election. But Demchak may have fallen victim to a government tax crackdown rather than electoral politics and, according to bne enquiries, his bad luck may be another man’s poetic justice. 

Ukraine’s State Tax Service announced September 3 that they had arrested the 38-year-old financier Demchak, owner of mid-sized Ukrainian Business Group, RD Bank and insurance and healthcare assets, in a rare move to prosecute a well-connected businessman for financial offences. Given such an arrest is so extraordinary, pundits have been quick to claim that the real reason for Demchak’s arrest is his work for the political opposition: Demchak was running for parliament in a first-past-the-post constituency against prominent Party of Regions parliamentarian Hrihory Kaletnik, head of the Rada’s agriculture committee. And Kaletnik’s son Ihor is head of the even more influential State Customs Service, making the Kaletnik family one of Ukraine’s most powerful political dynasties. 

This is also Demchak’s version of events. “From the minute of my registration as a parliamentary candidate pressure was brought on me from competitors,” Demchak said in a statement following his arrest. “First of all, they registered a clone candidate Andrei Demchak to deceive voters and take votes off me. A few days later, a smear campaign was launched against me in the media. They started to harass my wife and children with the aim of forcing me to retire from the electoral race. Because I refused to do so, I was arrested during one of my meetings with voters.” 

Then on September 7 a Kyiv court ordered Demchak’s custody to be extended for two months. “Everything is being done to prevent me from continuing the election campaign,” Demchak responded. The tax service denied any political component. 

Following the jailing of key opposition leaders Yulia Tymoshenko and Yury Lutsenko in the last year on what are widely regarded as politically motivated charges, arrests of lower level political opponents would be a sure sign that Ukraine was slipping towards Belarus standards of authoritarianism. “Demchak’s arrest was definitely a result of his parliamentary candidacy, since it was only after announcing his candidacy that he was arrested,” argues Vladimir Fesenko, head of the Penta Center for Applied Political Research. 

It is regarded as Ukraine’s major achievement that it has held successive free and fair elections, following the Orange Revolution that overturned rigged presidential elections in 2004, but fears are growing that the parliamentary election on October 28 could see an end to this. 

Mud-slinging or money-laundering? 

Demchak’s downfall has just accelerated. According to a Demchak aide, as quoted by Ukrainksaya Pravda, as a condition for his release from detention by November 3, Demchak has now agreed to withdraw his candidacy and to sell his bank, RD Bank. 

But while the timing of Demchak’s arrest seems prompted by his candidacy, this does not mean the charges he faces are trumped up. An official complaint against Demchak was filed by two MPs to the General Prosecutor’s Office on August 18, apparently providing the basis for his arrest. According to the complaint, Demchak was “rendering services in converting non-cash funds into cash funds via participants on the securities market” – ie. running what is known across the former Soviet Union as a “conversion centre”. 

A conversion centre is an informal financial facility converting companies’ booked funds into off-the-books cash, on an industrial scale and for an approximately 10% commission. The cash then goes to fuel Ukraine’s shadow economy, estimated at around 50% of total GDP, in particular by paying salaries “in envelopes” and thus avoiding payroll taxes. Ukraine’s security service puts the total volume of such “converted” funds at around $7.5bn per year, according to a report leaked in 2011. Two staple tools of conversion centres are fictive securities transactions and fictive import-export operations. 

Demchak’s structures have rejected any financial wrongdoing on their part. “RD Bank (member of Ukrainian Business Group) has never and does not engage in laundering funds and any other illegal operations and activity,” the bank said in a statement. 

But bne has obtained independent confirmation that Demchak ran conversion centres, from a source in the central Ukrainian town of Zhitomir. The source, 53-year-old Anatoly Rupeta, accuses Demchak of being a leading operator of conversion centres in Ukraine over a number of years. 

Blast from the past 

Rupeta tells bne he is fighting trumped-up criminal charges of large-scale fraud brought against him by Demchak’s structures, after he inadvertently stumbled across the operation of a massive conversion centre. 

According to Rupeta, his troubles started in 2007 when the previous owner of the small Zhitomir firm he was running, the head of a local bank’s foreign currency department, died in a car crash. It quickly transpired, according to Rupeta, that the deceased bank executive had been involved in one of Demchak’s conversion operations, via the bank where he worked. And unknown to Rupeta, the firm he had taken over from the bank executive in good faith was at the heart of the scheme, which involved foreign currency accounts at the bank Rupeta says he knew nothing of. “Only days after the car accident – in December 2007 – Ruslan Demchak came to me and explained the whole scheme, drawing a diagram to show me exactly where I stood,” says Rupeta, who retains Demchak’s sketch to this day. 

According to Rupeta, the scheme that Demchak described had processed $56.9m in 2006-07. “Demchak told me that if I and the widow of the bank executive did not return $2m in money – which I obviously did not have – he would arrange for criminal charges to be brought,” he says, explaining that Demchak needed to bring criminal charges against him to build a case for freezing the widow’s assets. 

Rupeta tells bne that Demchak’s conversion scheme worked via a $2m foreign currency credit line held by the deceased bank executive, which was secured by guarantees provided by local companies. Offshore firms would transfer dollar funds from Latvian and Lithuanian bank accounts as advance payments on non-existing foreign trade contracts with the Ukrainian companies. The local companies then transferred these funds to pay down the executive’s credit line. The executive then received cash payouts on the credit line, which were then distributed via Demchak’s structures to the scheme’s customers across Ukraine. “And there were a number of people at the bank with similar credit lines,” says Rupeta. 

According to Rupeta, Demchak made good on this threat to have criminal charges brought when one of the top managers in Demchak’s Ukrainian Business Group (UBG) filed a complaint to police against Rupeta. Demchak’s manager held power of attorney for a UK company, Corpmark Impex LLP, that had transferred funds to Rupeta’s company Magnolia. Corpmark Impex LLP, as well as Panamanian and New Zealand firms, also transferring funds to Rupeta’s company, all featured the now notorious Latvian nominee directors such as Erik Vanagels, Stan Gorin, and Voldemar Spatz, whose names feature in thousands of companies and numerous Ukrainian economic crime cases, including Highway Investment, a company that bne investigations has shown to be involved in the suspicious sale of an over-priced rig to the state oil and gas firm Naftogaz Ukrainy. “The UBG manager even claimed in court he is a personal acquaintance of Spatz,” says Rupeta. 

According to court documents, prosecutors allege that Corpmark paid Rupeta’s firm Magnolia $6m for a delivery of granite that never happened, with the $6m made as a 100% advance payment, despite the fact Rupeta had signed no contract. “When I point out that I am unknown among local granite producers, the prosecutors say this only proves that fraud was intended from the start,” he says. 

Valery Fedichin, partner at leading Kyiv law firm OMP, casts doubt on the prosecution case. “It is very unlikely that a legitimate UK company would transfer $6m to a Ukrainian company without a written contract, and especially the whole contract amount in advance,” he says. “Besides, a Ukrainian resident cannot do a foreign trade transaction without any paper work due to Ukrainian foreign exchange controls. So the resident itself would normally be concerned to sign a formal contract.” 

Facing the worst 

Rupeta counts himself lucky not to have been shut up in pre-trial detention for the four years that the criminal proceedings have lasted. But the worst is still ahead – Rupeta is facing a jail sentence of 10-14 years, with a court decision and sentencing expected within the coming year. Ukrainian courts convict 95% of all accused. 

For Rupeta, Demchak’s arrest on money-laundering charges ironically represents a last chance to avoid jail. “The UK company Corpmark Impex itself is long since dissolved,” says Rupeta, “but the Ukrainian courts will continue to grind until told to stop. Even if Demchak has only been arrested for political reasons, because he got in someone’s way, there is poetic justice in this, considering how he set me up.” 

Demchak via his press secretary denied any connection to the alleged activities and conversion centres. 

Kommersant Ukraine reported October 5 that Demchak’s bank RD Bank is now up for sale. The most interested party is a leading Ukrainian political dynasty, though not the Kaletniks this time, but the Klyuev brothers Andrih and Serhiy, secretary of the National Security Council and a member of the National Bank supervisory council respectively, with combined wealth put at $300m by Forbes. According to i>Kommersant Ukraine , Demchak’s bank may be small, but it is attractive to the Klyuevs and others as a national leader in cash handling and cash distribution services. 


Moldovan oligarch Plahotniuc could face prosecution in UK

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Graham Stack in Berlin for Business New Europe
October 23, 2012

Moldova’s first deputy speaker, Vladimir Plahotniuc, reputedly the country’s richest man and a political kingmaker, could face criminal prosecution in UK on contempt of court charges, according to lawyer Patrick Boylan of Simmons & Simmons, “if a London court finds he is behind the transfer of shares frozen under court order.”

According to Boylan, shares in UK company Tomdal Ltd. are believed to have been transferred to a Russian company, despite a London court having ordered an assets freeze during litigation. Plahotniuc features as the economic owner of the company, according to documents obtained by a court discovery order and seen by bne.

Tomdal is only one of several UK companies to which share packets in Moldovan banks and insurance companies were ultimately transferred without knowledge of their owners following apparently crooked court decisions in 2010-2011. Plahotniuc was revealed to be the beneficiary owner of all the UK companies, following the discovery order in England and Scotland. Lawyer Boylan is representing Moldovan businessmen Victor and Viorel Topa, who claim that the UK companies now own share packets rightly belonging to them and expropriated in 2010 and 2011 by Plahotniuc.

According to Boylan, Plahotniuc has already attempted to claim diplomatic immunity as deputy speaker of parliament in the framework of a Cyprus court case also relating to breach of a court-imposed asset freeze. “The claim was laughable, and the Cypriot court ruled that under international law he would not enjoy sovereign immunity,” Boylan said, who warned that, “English courts take contempt of court very seriously.”

In February 2012, a London high court judge handed down a 22-month prison sentence to the former owner of Kazakhstan’s BTA bank, Mukhtar Ablyazov, on contempt of court charges relating to breach of an asset freeze.

Plahotniuc has vigorously denied all the Topas’ allegations about his role in the Moldovan “raider attacks”. According to his press secretary Diana Danu, “the topic of the raider attacks was made a subject of a political campaign in Moldova, a smear campaign originating in Moldova, and coordinated by a criminal group led by Mssrs Topa, two business people that have been convicted by a court of law.” Danu says that any documents compromising Plahotniuc were forgeries.

Bank robbery

The waves of dodgy asset transfers labelled “raider attacks” in Moldova started in 2010 and peaked in 2011. “We had held a stake in Victoriabank since 2005 via companies,” Victor Topa tells bne, “but when we attended the shareholders’ meeting in July 2010, we suddenly found out that we no longer owned the shares.”

The Topas then discovered a whole series of court decisions had been secretly set in motion in the preceding months that had transferred most of their stake to non-resident companies. And hardly they got their breath back than further court decisions in 2011 disappeared the remainder of their shares in Victoriabank, an 18% stake in Moldovan savings bank Banca de Economii, and a controlling stake in Moldova’s second largest insurance company Asito. In all cases, the stakes were shifted to shell companies across the globe; ultimately they were parked with UK companies.

The Moldovan court decisions all involved alleged million-dollar debts owed by the Topas’ ownership vehicles to previously unknown offshores, which it was claimed were collateralised by the bank shares. They also involved the same court and group of judges, and crudely tampered paperwork including judgments entered post hoc on the bottom lines of the court ledgers for those dates. “On the one hand it was sophisticated, on the other hand it was unbelievably brutal and transparent, and easy to convince an English judge that these court decisions had been fraudulently obtained,” lawyer Boylan says.

Bizarrely, for all the shenanigans in Moldova, court discovery orders obtained in England and Scotland as well as Cyprus then revealed that Plahotniuc was down in black and white as economic owner of all the companies that now control the disputed share packets – without any smokescreen use of strawmen or relatives. Since Plahotniuc’s outing as owner of the stakes, moves have apparently been made by at least one of the UK companies, Tomdal Ltd., to sell on the stakes despite the assets freeze. The moves could yet spell trouble for Plahotniuc if he is judged to be their initiator.

All change

The Topas are not the only ones hurting. Altogether the “raider waves” and linked transactions saw large stakes in Moldova’s three largest banks, a controlling stake in a smaller bank, and controlling stakes in the two largest insurance companies mysteriously change hands 2010-2012, with no clarity over the new owners. The country’s reformist prime minister, Vlad Filat, called the raiding spree “an attack not only on our banking system, but on our country itself.”

Bogdan Tirdea, Moldova’s leading oligarch watcher, says the amounts could be as much as $100m. “There has never been anything like this in Moldovan history.”

For all of Filat’s outrage, only in one case has the outcome of a raid been reversed: in August 2011, a Moldovan court transferred a blocking stake of just under 27% in Moldova’s largest bank Agroindbank from ownership by a pool of Slovenian financial investors to two Seychelles companies, on the basis of a forged ruling from a Russian court. Agroindbank took a €20m loan from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) in 2009, with further funding under consideration. The panic among the European diplomatic community in Chisinau was great, and pressure piled on behind-the-scenes. A quick Supreme Court decision in September 2011 resulted in the Agroindbank stake being returned to the Slovenian owners. The EBRD refused to comment on the situation in Moldova despite holding a blocking stake in Victoriabank and being the main creditor to Agroindbank.

Domestic investors have been less lucky than the quick response the EBRD got. Russian banker German Gorbuntsov was worst hit – literally. His 80% stake in small Moldovan bank Universalbank was also transferred by Moldovan court order to a Seychelles company in August 2011. The bank had its license withdrawn in February 2012. Gorbuntsov, who has been accused of money-laundering in Russia, was then shot and badly wounded in London in April this year. Gorbuntsov has said he believes Russian interests were behind the shooting.

The change of owners in Moldovan companies is still going on, although with less brutal methods. In July, five recently registered Moldovan companies bought 80% of the country’s largest insurance company on the open market from Russia’s Rosgosstrakh, for around $16m. According to information obtained by the Topas, for which there is no independent confirmation, two of these companies raised funds for the acquisitions using as collateral the bank shares parked with the UK shell companies.

Another Moldovan company that apparently raised funds by collateralizing the disputed stakes, GSER Grup, appears involved in Payza, a global e-payment company that is a successor to Alertpay. Payza CEO Alastair Graham declined to comment on Moldova plans.

And following the transfer of the Topas’ 18% stake in state-controlled savings bank Banca de Economii – slated for full privatisation by the government – war broke out between the new unidentified minorities and the state’s interest in the bank, leading to two competing boards elected in April 2011, and an interim solution only reached in August, with the unknown minorities getting two representatives on the board – but still no clarity about their identity.

Democracy hijacked by oligarchs

Moldova’s democratic breakthrough of 2009, which saw a pro-European coalition replace a conservative Communist regime, stirred hope that Moldova could be a bridgehead for reform in the former Soviet Union. Some progress has been made, but it seems powerful businessmen such as Plahotniuc, behind the scenes during the Communist administration, adroitly jumped ships in 2009 to achieve direct power via democracy. Plahotniuc, who made his money in fuel trading under Communist president Vladimir Voronin, is now first deputy president of Moldova’s Democratic Party, a key member of a ruling Alliance for European Integration coalition that enjoys only a slim parliamentary majority vis-a-vis the Communist opposition. He is regarded as the party’s main financial backer.

The “bank robberies” pose obvious questions about the rule of law in Moldova, and not about bent judges at commercial courts, but of politicisation or commercialisation of the country’s top legal offices.

Two weeks after the Topas went public in August 2010 with their accusations against Plahotniuc, Moldova’s Prosecutor General, Valeriu Zubco, after consulting with the Anti-Corruption Prosecutor, duly launched criminal proceedings – against the Topas. In October 2011 Victor Topa was sentenced in absentia to 10 years in jail on blackmail charges; Viorel Topa was sentenced in absentia in January 2010 to eight years in jail on fraud charges. Both men, now resident in Germany, say the charges are politically motivated. “The Topas may not have been angels but the timing of the charges makes it clear they were political,” says Tirdea.

PM Filat has acknowledged as much. In an interview on October 16, 2011 in newspaper Timpul, Filat indicated that Zubco was Plahotniuc’s man. “Then there was the vote for the candidate for the post of general prosecutor – Valeriu Zubco. I invited all my colleagues from the Alliance for European Integration to the meeting, looked them in the eyes and asked: ‘Whose man is he?’ I wanted to know what they would tell me, although I already knew then that the post was assigned by quota to the Alliance Moldova Nuestra, but they had given it to the Democratic Party in exchange for getting their man as head of the security service. So the Democratic Party got the post of Prosecutor General.”

Filat in the interview further recalled how during negotiations on the renewed Alliance for European Integration, Plahotniuc made the prime minister wait in the lobby of his hotel Codru while he finished with a girl. “We then discussed the creation of the alliance. They (Democratic Party) tried to make me give them as much as possible, and I hoped that after this they would have satisfied their hunger for state institutions and would be governed by common sense in their work. Unfortunately this has not happened.”

“None of this would have been possible without protection from the very top,” says oligarch-watcher Tirdea. “Plahotniuc controls both the Prosecutor General and the Anti-Corruption Prosecutor, and this has been the root of all the evil.”


Latvia’s bad bank gunning for Rosneft deputy

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November 12, 2012
Graham Stack in Berlin for Business New Europe (www.bne.eu)

Latvia’s asset recovery vehicle Reverta is gunning for Zhan Khudainatov, the brother of Rosneft deputy CEO Eduard Khudainatov – and possibly for Eduard himself, bne can reveal. According to Reverta, the Khudainatovs have defaulted on loans totaling $78m – and have now resorted to gross fraud to ditch their creditors, lawyers claim.

The case highlights the conflicts of interest, fraud and corruption at the very top of Rosneft, now the world’s largest listed oil company, and gives an idea of the kind of issues that awaits BP as it becomes a 20% stakeholder in Russia’s new national champion.

Reverta, the “bad bank” successor organisation to the nationalized Parex bank, tells bne that a mysterious Swiss company called Krini Holding Limited, linked to Rosneft deputy CEO Eduard Khudainatov and his brother, took out over $100m of loans from Parex through 2008, acquiring a Siberian gas company and building processing facilities. The assets were sold in early 2012 for just over $400m, but most of the loan was never repaid, forcing Reverta to take court action in Russia against the companies and individuals.

The $400m side-business allegedly sold this year by Rosneft’s deputy CEO Khudainatov – a state executive throughout almost his entire career – encapsulates how the Kremlin’s tightening grip on energy has twinned with officials making vast private profits. This is the elephant in the room that BP will now confront following the deal agreed in October that will see the UK major take a 20% stake in Rosneft following a merger with its Russian joint venture TNK-BP.

Conflicts of interest

According to documents seen by bne, in 2004 Eduard Khudainatov held a general power of attorney for Krini Holding. In 2004, Krini Holding took a loan of $40m from Parex to purchase an energy company Severneft, which held a license issued for a gasfield on the hydrocarbon-rich Yamal Peninsula. Eduard Khudainatov’s brother Zhan than became CEO of Severneft.

Khudainatov at the time was not a private businessman, but CEO of the state-owned Gazprom subsidiary Severneftegazprom, developing the massive Yuzho-Russkoe gasfield also on the Yamal Peninsula. His apparent undisclosed private business interest in the gas branch thus created a glaring conflict of interest.

There seems little doubt Eduard Khudainatov was the main man at Krini Holding. “We have documents showing a general power of attorney of Eduard Khudainatov for Krini Holding, his personal guarantee for the company and proof that he personally performed a number of transactions on behalf of the company,” says Viktoria Burkovskaya of Moscow law firm Egorov Puginsky Afanasiev & Partners, which is representing the Parex successor company Reverta in Russian courts. “These documents point to Eduard Khudainatov’s close mutual ties with the company.”

Rosneft failed to respond to email, fax and telephone enquiries on the matter over the course of a week. Eduard Khudainatov has previously denied any link to Severneft or Severorgsintez, or any linked companies.

In 2006-08, an affiliate of Severneft, Severorgsintez, took a further $87m in loans from Parex to construct processing facilities on the Yamal Peninsula for gas extracted by Severneft. The loans were guaranteed by Severneft, and Eduard Khudainatov in 2006 provided a personal guarantee for Severneft, according to documents seen by bne.

Loan repayment on the Severorgsintez loan was due to start in 2010, but nothing was paid back. Parex/Reverta started legal moves in Russia to reclaim the debt, one of their 10 largest outstanding loans.

The Khudainatovs then took very evasive action: in August 2011, Severneft assigned its assets and license to a new subsidiary, Severneft-Urengoy. Severneft and Severorgsintez then simply liquidated themselves, despite the outstanding loan. Adding insult to injury for Reverta, in January Severneft-Urengoy was sold to Russian chemicals giant Eurochem for a whopping $403m, roughly four-times the investments made in license and facilities by the Severneft owners.

Seeing their clients flush with cash while welshing on debts, Reverta took off the kid gloves and filed a complaint of gross fraud against Zhan Khudainatov and other directors of Severneft and Severorgsintez in April 2012 – offenses that carry a minimum five-year sentence in Russia. “The case is at the pre-investigation stage,” says Burkovskaya.

Dance of the PEPs

Khudainatov’s rise to riches started when in early 2000 he headed Vladimir Putin’s first presidential electoral campaign in the Yamal-Nenets autonomous district, part of the Tyumen region, where most of Russia’s vast oil and gas reserves are located. And when Putin was elected president in March 2000, he duly named Khudainatov the federal inspector for Yamal-Nenets, tasked with ensuring the Kremlin’s writ ran in the district.

Yamal-Nenets soon became the scene of a fierce war waged by the Kremlin under Vladimir Putin and his new Gazprom management to regain control of the huge Yuzhno-Russkoe gasfield, which the previous 1990s Gazprom management had mysteriously divested to private gas trader Itera. In 2002, the company holding the license, Severneftgazprom, was finally returned to the Gazprom fold – and Khudainatov made CEO in 2003. Yuzhno-Russkoe, which went into operation in 2007, is now the main supplier to the Nord Stream pipeline, via which Russia directly supplies gas to Germany under Baltic Sea. Thus Khudainatov’s apparent private acquisition of Severneft in 2004, as alleged by Reverta, seems the flipside to the Kremlin’s tightening grip on the energy sector – and could count as a reward for loyalty.

And according to bne enquiries, the counter-party in the Severneft deal was another top state energy official, Semen Vainstok, who was at the time CEO of state oil pipeline monopolist Transneft. Before its sale to Krini Holding, Severneft was owned by oil company Gorizont-Neft and Stroikredit Bank, both closely linked to Vainstok at his old stamping ground of Lukoil-West Siberia, according to company documents seen by bne.

In 2007, Russia’s accounting chamber investigated Transneft’s finances under Vainstok’s watch. According to the report, as leaked to anti-corruption blogger Alexei Navalny, during Transneft’s construction of the East-Siberia-Pacific oil pipeline some $4bn had been siphoned off by 2007 by structures believed linked to Vainstok, including by Stroikredit Bank.

The Severneft 2004 deal points to Vainstok’s close commercial ties with the Kremlin’s inner circle buying him immunity. Vainstok left Russia for Israel in 2008, with no criminal charges ever brought. He could not be reached for comment.

Ironically, the murky background to the Parex-Severneft loans may also now let the Khudainatovs off the hook – at the expense of Latvian taxpayers who bailed out the bank in 2008. Anti-money laundering legislation demands tight scrutiny of banking arrangements for state executives, known in the jargon as politically exposed persons (PEPs). But Parex before nationalisation in 2008 flaunted the regulations, specialising in dodgy banking services for PEPs. “The bank’s philosophy was that all commercial loans should fund bribery,” former head of international relationships at Parex, John Christmas, tells bne.

The murkiness means that documentation of the Severneft loans is incomplete. “During change of ownership in 2008, the former shareholders stole certain documents pertaining to key bank deals with Russian customers,” says Reverta. “We suspect some originals of the Severorgsintez collateral agreements have vanished.”

BP’s Sechin question

The $400m question regarding Eduard Khudainatov is: who pushed his rise to the top, and did they take a cut in the side business?

The one man who stands out in promoting Khudainatov’s career is Igor Sechin, Putin’s energy tsar, now CEO of Rosneft. In 2008, after the Yuzhno-Russkoe field went online successfully, the then deputy PM Sechin promoted Khudainatov to be deputy head of Rosneft, where Sechin was chairman of the supervisory board. Then in 2009, Sechin made Khudainatov CEO of Rosneft. In March this year, re-elected President Vladimir Putin made Sechin CEO of Rosneft, and Khudainatov – who is reported to refer to Sechin simply as “the boss” – humbly stepped back down to deputy CEO without a murmur of complaint.

Sechin for his part in January, when still deputy PM with a remit for energy, obliged state energy executives to disclose their and their families’ assets as part of a belated anti-corruption drive after mass protests in Moscow – but exempted Rosneft from the order. Sechin said Rosneft met with obligations voluntarily but it is not known that Khudainatov disclosed large cash holdings. Rosneft discloses only that Khudainatov holds a stake of 0.0605% in Rosneft, worth $43.5m at current market cap.

According to Putin, BP’s recent decision to take a 20% stake in Rosneft and two seats on the board should lead to greater transparency in the company. But the example of Khudainatov’s business interests on the side – a rule rather than exception in Russia – will be a warning to BP of the compliance risks entailed in Russian state business. “Those seats could help us influence corporate governance,” BP’s press service tells bne, but would not comment on what conditionality over hiring they will seek from Rosneft.



Achilles Heel of the “Ukrainian Stolypin”

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 Graham Stack in Kyiv

Party of Regions MP Eduard Prutnik sees the need for a Ukrainian Stolypin – both a Kyiv statue to the last reforming prime minister of the Russian empire, as well as a real-life statesman for Ukraine’s troubled present: “erecting a statue to the great prime minister-reformer will create a striking symbol for the need for a course of reforms that will make the people masters of their destiny.”

 

Perhaps there is one man Prutnik believes has what it takes: Sergei Arbuzov, 36 year old head of the National Bank of Ukraine, and a protege of Prutnik at the turn of the century, when Prutnik was manager of Viktor Yanukovych’s family assets. Arbuzov and associated officials visited Washington DC in October 2012, and positioned themselves, according to their US interlocutors, as a team of “young reformers with a clear if undisclosed plan”, says Sonya Koshkina of Levy Bereg: “like people who have no doubt they will soon be at the very heights of power and don’t have any hesitation to say this. Soon meaning after the October 28 elections.” “I am actively involved in planning and carrying out economic reforms initiated by the president,” Arbuzov acknowledged for his part, in an English-language interview, despite the NBU’s formal independence from the executive.

 

Arbuzov’s pedigree certainly speaks for him: his mother, Valentina, is CEO of the All-Ukrainian Development Bank (VBR), a fast-growing bank owned by the Oleksandr Yanukovych, the younger son of President Viktor Yanukovych.

 

One ambitious Ukrainian politician has already lost to Arbuzov’s meteoric rise from regional obscurity: Oligarch Valery Khoroshkovsy was fired from his post as head of Ukraine’s security service SBU in January 2012, and moved to the finance ministry. After only six weeks he lost that job to an Arbuzov man, Yury Kolobov and was kicked upstairs to the post of first deputy prime minister, which is prestigious but lacks real levers of power. Humilliatingly for Khoroshkovsky, on November 2, Yulia Nosacheva, a close ally of Arbuzov and Kolobov, took Khoroshkovsky’s place on the supervisory boards of the state-owned banks Oschadbank and Ukreksimbank, distancing him further from state financial flows.

 

One other man is afraid for his job: white-haired prime minister Mykola Azarov, whom it is rumoured could be replaced by Arbuzov in the coming weeks. But he will not go without a fight, and is positioning himself with the rising Arbuzov faction against Khoroshkovksy. In comments made internally, but reported by Germany’s most respected daily, Frankfurter Allgemeine, Azarov savaged Khoroshkovsky October 29 for deliberately ruining Ukraine’s relationships with the West by jailing Yulia Tymoshenko, and thus blocking Ukraine’s access to IMF funds.

 

Khoroshkovsky’s poison pill

 

But while Khoroshkovksy may now be bound for a seat on the largely decorative National Security Council, during his last weeks as head of the SBU in November 2011, he left a poison pill for his young rival Arbuzov: an arrest warrant for Arbuzov’s former employer and colleague, Pavlo Borulko, in connection with SBU accusation of large-scale money laundering and even murder.

 

In November 2011 the SBU issued an arrest warrant for Pavlo Borulko, prompting the latter to flee Ukraine for Belarus. In April 2012, the SBU then went public with extraordinary charges against Borulko together with MP Oleksandr Shepelev, another well-connected 40-something Donetsk banker, whom they called Borulko’s accomplice: charges of massive fraud 2008-2010, and allegations linking the two to contract slayings that covered their tracks.

 

“The central investigative directorate of the SBU has uncovered the theft by the owner of the banks Evropeiskii, National Standard and Volodomyrskii, Pavlo Borulko and other individuals, of UAH 620m ($76m) from the Guaranteed Deposit Fund,” read the dry press release. “In 2009-2010, offcials at these banks on the day before their licenses were withdrawn, opened 1339 deposit accounts in the names of fictive individuals. Using the accounts of companies they controlled they transferred non-existent money to the accounts of these fictive individuals.” When the bank was liquidated, the Guaranteed Deposit Fund paid out the fictive deposits.

 

The SBU also accused Borulko of conspiring with MP Oleksandr Shepelev to steal repo funds disbursed from the NBU to the value of UAH 315m ($39m) and a further UAH 223m ($27m) in funds from Rodovid Bank, using fictive collateral to obtain the funds.

 

That was not all: “In February this year, a witness to the inner circle of Borulko provided the investigation with incriminating testimony against Borulko and an MP, and also mentioned that the the accused had threatened him. In the evening, after questioning, the witness was found dead in his own office. (…) An investigation of premeditated murder has now been opened. On one other witness, who gave investigators important testimony, there was attempted murder using automatic weapons.” In addition, according the SBU, another witness in the investigation fell to his death from a high-rise window.

 

Arbuzov’s Achilles Heel

 

The close Borulko connection could still prove be Arbuzov’s Achilles heel in his meteoric rise and his enemies such as Khoroshkovsky will seek to make the most of it: Borulko was the man who gave Arbuzov his big break, after their careers had started together in the late 1990s in the small Donetsk town of Konstantinovka, population 100,000, at the same bank, the local branch of Privatbank. Arbuzov’s mother Valentina, was head of the Donetsk division of Privatbank 1994-2007.

 

Despite Borulko’s apparently criminal career, It is not clear that Arbuzov ever severed ties with him. Arbuzov refuses to comment on his earlier ties to Borulko.

 

According to the Spark Interfax database, in 2002-2003, Borulko, his patron Prutnik, and their business partner Dmitro Goncharov, together with wives and associates, acquired the tiny Donetsk bank, Donechinna, later renamed as Ukraine Business Bank (Ukrbiznesbank). Borulko himself moved to head Donetsk bank Donechinna in June 2002, the year the bank installed its first autoteller.

 

But in November 2002, governor of Donetsk, Viktor Yanukovych, was made prime minister, and took with him to Kyiv his ‘manager’ Prutnik, who became head of the board of the state savings bank Oschadbank. Prutnik in turn took with him to Kyiv his own team, including Borulko who became deputy head of the treasury at the bank, and Yury Kolobov, now finance minister, who became head of the treasury, Borulko’s direct boss. Kolobov and Borulko then took responsibility among other things for disbursal of compensation sums to citizens who had lost their savings in Oschadbank after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Borulko left the bank in 2005, but his continued closeness to the Yanukovych family meant he was made adviser to then prime minister Yanukovych in 2007.

 

Borulko replaced himself at Bank Donechhinna in 2003 with Sergei Arbuzov, his colleague from Konstaninovka’s Privatbank, who stayed at the bank until 2009. Borulko and Goncharov were listed among the bank’s owners alongside Prutnik until September 2008, when structures formerly run by Prutnik, but already passing under control of Oleskandr Yanukovych, took complete control of the bank.

Thus bankers Borulko and Goncharuk were Arbuzov’s employers for six years, while also running a number of other small regional banks.  What was Borulko up to in these years? Already in April 2007, Anatoly Brezvin, head of the Ukraine’s tax administration, at an Interfax press conference detailed a massive money-laundering and conversion operation centred on the Donetsk division of Avtokrazbank, closely associated with Borulko, and headed by a close Borulko and Arbuzov associate, Konstantin Krivenko, according to the bank’s public disclosures.

 

Money-laundering and murder

 

Borulko and Arbuzov’s employment in the Konstantinovka branch of Privatbank overlapped with Oleksandr Medvedko, like Borulko a native of the town, heading the prosecutor’s office. By 2002 Medvedko had become Ukraine’s deputy prosecutor general, and from 2007 to 2010 he was the country’s prosecutor general. Konstantinovka is a small place and Medvedko is widely reported to be married to the aunt of Borulko’s wife. In an interview in 2009, Borulko’s business partner Dmitro Goncharov confirmed the two women “were close friends”.

 

In 2004 came the Orange Revolution, and the appointment of anti-corruption campaigner Yury Lutsenko to the post of Interior Minister. Lutsenko quickly put together a special unit under police major Roman Erokhin to investigate money-laundering by a network of Donetsk banks. Erokhin was then murdered by hired killers in June 2006. The ensuing investigation linked both Borulko and Shepelev to the killing.

 

Judgement was pronounced on the killers December 6 2010. http://www.reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/12906450. According to testimony cited in the verdict, Erokhin’s brother, also a top police officer, had been informed by the security service of Arbuzov’s Ukrbiznesbank that Shepelev ran ‘financial groups’ across a number of banks, and was for this reason in conflict with Erokhin. Other testimony said the network was based on Bank Perspektiva, later Unikombank, a bank the SBU has publicly linked to Shepelev.

 

According to the verdict, the group of killers was initially briefed at premises owned by Shepelev, apparently to plan the kidnapping of Dmitro Goncharov – close business parter of Borulko and also co-owner of Ukrbiznesbank – whose contact details were found with the group. The killers claimed they backed out off the Goncharov kidnap attempt due to the fear of armed resistance. “A few days later”, they were approached by an “unknown party” with the proposal to take Erokhin, which they then implemented, kidnapping and then shooting him in leg, head and stomach, and burying the corpse.

 

Considering the prosecution’s case was overseen by Borulko’s associate Medvedko, it may be that prosecutors invented the implausible Goncharov kidnapping story to separate Shepelev, Goncharov and Borulko from implication in ordering Erokhin’s murder, after the original Lutsenko-influenced investigation had obtained such evidence. One of the defendants retracted his testimony about Goncharov’s planned kidnapping, saying there had been no such plan and that it had been suggested to him by investigators in return for promised favours that never materialised.

 

In June 2012, another notorious contract killing was brought to trial, linked to Shepelev and Borulko: that of Sergei Kirichenko, chairman of Avtokrazbank, disembowelled in a frenzied knife attack January 2003. http://www.reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/25031391. The defendant, a native of Konstantinovka who was directly involved in organising the killing, was found guilty, but given a light sentence of 9 years backdated to 2009. According to the verdict, the killing was ordered by one of the owners of Donkreditinvestbank, likely to have been Shepelev, who has publicly disclosed his ownership of this bank. Analogous to the Erokhin murder case, the prosecution case included a curious preliminary incident in the run-up to the murder: the defendant testified that the same owner of Donkreditinvestbank who ordered Kirichenko’s slaying (Shepelev) had previously paid him for stealing a car from a second co-owner of Donkredinvestbank, indicating the two owners were in conflict with each other. The identity of the second owner whose car was allegedly stolen is unclear, but may have again been Borulko or Borulko’s associate Goncharov, who earlier headed Donkreditinvestbank’s foreign currency department. So the incident may again have constituted an attempt by prosecutors to separate Borulko and Goncharov from implication in the killing.

 

Privat doubts

 

Although Oleksandr Medvedko left the prosecutor general’s office in 2010, the Konstantinovka connection is still strong and even growing in top state posts: Yulia Nosacheva, head of the Kyiv tax inspectorate, started her career with Arbuzov and Borulko at Konstantinovka’s Privatbank, and current interior minister, previously head of the tax service, Vitaly Zakharchenko, headed the town’s police at the time.

 

A further cluster of current top officials worked at other Privatbank branches in the 1990s in Donetsk region, where Arbuzov’s mother Valentina ruled the roost, and also Kharkiv: finance minister Yury Kolobov, his close associate Aleksandr Dubikhvost, head of the NBU’s hard currency reserves department, Roman Maguta, head of Ukraine’s state audit chamber, Viktoria Kononikhina, deputy CEO of state-owned Ukreksimbank, and Konstantin Krivenko, member of the board of Ukraine’s National Securities and Stock Market Commission, where he heads the Committee on Monitoring, Reporting, Disclosure and Prudential Supervision.

 

Surprisingly, despite this proliferation of former employees of the Privatbank Donetsk division in top state positions today, Valentina Arbuzova’s then bank enjoyed a far from spotless reputation in the late 1990s when these figures started their career.

 

According to media reports from the time, at a meeting in 1997, the Donetsk regional administration’s committee for combating organised crime, in the presence of top regional and national law enforcement officials, including two deputy heads of the SBU, singled out Valentina Arbuzova for her bank’s money laundering activities, in particular the creation of fictive companies, abuse of loro accounts and hard currency transactions. The regional prosecutor said that criminal cases had been opened against Privatbank officials for implementing money transfers, up to $200,000 dollars per day, on fictive contracts.

 

In 1998, in an article published in the government announcer, Golos Ukrainy, Ukraine’s then prosecutor general Mikhail Potrebenko singled out Valentina Arbuzova’s bank as having laundered funds for a major organised crime group, using eleven fictive companies with accounts at Donetsk’s Privatbank division.

 

Things do not seem to have improved after the turn of the century. The Mariupol branch of Donetsk Privatbank was wracked by scandals 2002-2003, when its head, Tatiana Kudina, was first accused of stealing depositors’ funds, and then of running a huge fraudulent VAT reimbursement scheme.

 

Internet scam

 

The first Internet data communication networks were rolled out through Ukraine in the 1990s by a German joint venture with national telecom fixed line monopolist Ukrtelekom. The joint venture, Infokom, installed the ‘Ukrpak’ network initially for corporate clients, especially banks.

 

Uniquely in Donetsk region, however, Infokom operated through a local partner ZAO DORIS, founded in 1996, co-owned and run by Olesandr Shepelev, represented on paper by his grandmother Maria Shevchenko, and a local strong man, Party of Regions MP Nurulislam Arkallaev, represented on paper by his wife. Infokom and DORIS rolled out a nationwide data network for corporate clients, primarily banks linking up to global payment systems, large companies and government bureaucracies. DORIS faded in importance after the turn of the century, as Ukrtelekom started expanding its own network, but in the 1990s DORIS had a monopoly on internet communications for corporate clients in Donetsk region. Thus Shepelev and Arkallaev effectively ran Donetsk banks’ payment systems around the turn of the century.

 

Privatbank was one of DORIS’ clients, and a pioneer in using internet for data transfer. Around 2000, Privatbank in Donetsk introduced the first special payment centres handling households’ payment of utility bills, together with billing the state for the accompanying subsidies, that reached 100% for some classes of consumers, such as impoverished pensioners. Such centres thus controlled data for all local households, including personal data, and handled large financial flows. The first such centre was installed in Konstantinovka, where Arbuzov headed the town’s Privatbank branch.

 

In 2002, in the last year of Arbuzov’s employment as head of the branch, media reported a fraudulent scheme apparently run through the bank since 2000, involving the utilities billing datacenter: the scam was based on the centre not reporting deaths of consumers as required by contract, and thus continuing to claim state subsidies for utilities bills of pensioners, frequently as much as 100% of the bill,  for years after their death, effectively the classic ‘dead souls’ scam known since Gogol’s times.

 

The fourth bank

 

Borulko and associates may have continued as Achilles heel for Arbuzov even after the latter’s move to Kyiv in 2010. One of the figures closest connected to Borulko’s banks 2008-2009, former chairman of the supervisory board of Borulko’s National Standard, and CEO of his Evropeiskii Bank, Konstantin Krivenko, also originally from the Donetsk Privatbank division, was made adviser to Arbuzov in 2010, immediately before he took over at the National Bank. According to unconfirmed sources quoted by Ukrainskaya Pravda, Krivenko and Arbuzov are godfathers to each others’ children. Krivenko is now a member of the National Securities and Stock Market Commission.

 

While the ‘bank robberies’ that the SBU publicly attribute to Borulko and Shepelev took place 2008-2009, in fact the scheme went into overdrive in 2010, after the Party of Regions came to power and were effectively calling the shots at the National Bank even before the resignation of long-serving head Volodymyr Stelmakh in December 2010.

 

The SBU in press communications in 2012 named three banks used in the deposit compensation scheme, but also mentioned a fourth unnamed bank. That bank was Dialogbank, a tiny Dnipropetrovsk bank put under temporary administration by the NBU in 2009. In 2010 extraordinary things happened at the bank. Still under temporary administration of the NBU at the start of 2010, in January 2010, Dialogbank was readmitted to full membership of the GDF, meaning that new deposits would be fully insured. In April 2010 a new investor injected UAH177.5m (22m)  into the bank’s capital, and in July 2010 the NBU withdrew administrators.

 

By October 2010, the tiny bank’s loan book had grown from UAH 219m ($27m) in April 2010 to 826m ($101m), almost entirely loans made to legal entities. At the same time, deposits expanded from UAH 111m ($14m) in April 2010 to UAH 1092m ($134m) in October 2010, i.e. almost tenfold in 6 months. http://www.bank.gov.ua/control/uk/publish/category?cat_id=84853. While the loans went to legal entities, almost all the new deposits were owned by natural persons, according to NBU data.

 

In November 2010, the NBU reintroduced temporary administration. In May 2011, the bank’s licence was withdrawn and it was liquidated – and the process of the Guaranteed Deposit Fund paying out to the ‘depositors’ initiated.

 

Examination of a number of law suits accompanying the liquidation of Dialogbank 2011-2012 shows that investors acquired the bank in April 2010 using a vehicle, Spetstroiproject-2007, whose owner on paper, was the CEO of Voskhod. Voskhod, a development company that builds and runs the Obzhora shopping mall chain in Donetsk, was co-founded in 2000 by none other than the wives of Oleksandr Shepelev and Vyacheslav Sobolev, former deputy mayor of Donetsk, according to Spark Interfax. Party of Regions MP Nurulislam Arkallaev, Shepelev’s partner in data network operator ZAO DORIS, took a stake in the company in 2006, and in fact is regarded by local sources as its guardian angel from the very beginning.

 

One week prior to recapitalisation of the bank in April 2010, Dialogbank had provided loans to five small companies roughly equivalent to the funds then injected into the bank’s capital. The loans thus apparently used to buy the bank in April 2010 were collateralised by a building owned by Arkallaev, at Universitskaya 36a in Donetsk, and the mortgage agreement was drawn up by public notary Victoria Soboleva, ex-wife of Vyacheslav, according to court records. After withdrawal of the bank’s license May 2011, the outstanding loans were settled against the capital injection, which had been declared invalid by the NBU, freeing the collateral from claims by the bank.

 

Arbuzov later claimed that the NBU had cracked down on the scheme. “We understand what happened in this bank and introduced a number of restrictions that prevented implementation of the planned scheme by its organizers,” he told Zerkalo Nedeli in February 2011.

 

In fact, court records shows that it was not the NBU, but Khoroshkovky’s SBU which had intervened November 2010, opening a criminal investigation into theft of funds from the DGF in the cases of Dialogbank, Volodmyrsky, Evropeiskii and Nationalny Standard, according to court records. http://www.reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/25773909

 

Additionally, according to information provided by the DGF, it paid out a total of UAH 93m to 927 depositors / natural persons after the liquidation of Dialogbank in May 2011. But a court ruling of 14 December 2011 details that a suspiciously similar number of individual depositors, 920, had transferred their deposits to a Donetsk company Triumf – Servis, one of the five companies receiving loans in April 2010 prior to acquisition of the bank.

http://www.reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/20268729

 Thus apparently a payout was made after all to the organisers of the scheme, despite intervention by SBU and assurances by NBU.

 

While Borulko has fled to Belarus, which appears to refuse to extradite him, Shepelev in October 2012 was still in Ukraine, fighting a parliamentary election as an independent. While it was clear that he would lose, and thus lose his immunity from prosecution, he was playing it cool in an interview he gave to RBK Ukraine in October: “Mr Derevyanko (SBU press secretary) made his announcement seven months ago. Since then, there has been enough time for investigative proceedings. If any criminal investigation was in progress, they would at least have invited me for an interview. (…) For three years rumours have circulated about my implication in various investigations, but if they really wanted to remove my deputy’s immunity, believe me they would have done it along time ago.”

 

 

 

 


Yanukovych ‘family’ muscle in on Quinns’ Ukraine mall

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Graham Stack for Business New Europe (www.bne.eu)

 

While Sean Quinn Sr, once Ireland’s richest man, goes to jail in Dublin for diverting assets placed under court injunction, bne enquiries indicate that one of the assets in question, Kyiv’s Ukraina shopping mall, has been pulled into the orbit of the family of Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych – and out of the reach of Ireland’s authorities who claim it.

 

Ireland has been following on tenterhooks the slow motion fall of tycoon Sean Quinn Sr, formerly Ireland’s richest man but now a bankrupt jailbird. Part of the action has been set in Ukraine, including the drama’s top-rating “episode”: a hidden camera showing secret talks in Kyiv in January between Quinn family members and shadowy off-camera Ukrainians, which was leaked to press in July. The talks centred on the fate of the Ukraina shopping mall in the heart of Kyiv, which Sean Quinn owned, and which Ireland’s state-owned bank that was set up to try to clean up the mess of bad loans caused by the financial crisis is trying to recover, in lieu of Quinn’s $3.5bn debt.

 

This so-called “bad bank”, Irish Bank Resolution Corporation (IBRC), even used the video recording in court to prove that the Quinns still controlled Ukraina mall, and had thus diverted assets in defiance of court orders. The Quinns argued the video showed that on the contrary they had lost control of the mall, and were begging for payments.

 

Shopping for assets

 

The saga started in 2011, with the Quinns facing bankruptcy and attempting to shift ownership of real estate assets across Central and Eastern Europe away from their creditors, as they have admitted. Quinn Holdings Sweden AB held 92.75% of the Ukraina mall. But as acknowledged by the Quinns, they assigned a $45m debt claim against Ukraina to shell companies as a means of asset stripping. The Ukraina shopping mall brings in around $10m in rent per year, and is valued at around $78m.

 

But the Quinns, while admitting initial intent to divert assets, say that in the course of the tangled machinations, they were double-crossed and lost control over the mall to local partners due to questionable court decisions in Ukraine.

The IBRC argues, however, that the Quinns are still calling the shots – and thus in contempt of court injunctions, a criminal offence. A Dublin high court sentenced Sean Quinn Sr to a nine-week prison sentence on November 2, following three-month sentences handed down to Sean Quinn Jr and his cousin Peter Quinn in the summer.

 

In December 2011, a Kyiv court recognised the debt claim against the Ukraina mall of Cyprus offshore Lyndhurst. In the following months after the decision, a complex chain of securities transactions saw the Ukraina debt transferred first to an obscure Kyiv brokerage Zenit, and then onto an equally obscure Kyiv brokerage Elegant Invest. In July, a Kyiv court ordered that Elegant Invest be recognised as the successor to Lyndhurst, in the court decision of December 2011 legitimising the $45m debt claim against Ukraina.

 

President of mall Ukraina?

 

According to bne enquiries, the Elegant Invest transaction shows that the Ukraina shopping mall has indeed been swept away from Ireland’s reach and into the arms of the extended “family’” of Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych.

Elegant Invest is an affiliate of an equally mysterious, but far more famous company, TOV Tantalit, which owns the 130-hectare estate and palatial villa in Mezhyhirya near Kyiv that is the extravagant private residence of Yanukovych. Formally, Tantalit only leases the formerly state-owned property to Yanukovych, but media have widely speculated that the arrangement is simply a smokescreen to hide the president’s ownership of the enormous property.

 

The link between Tantalit and Elegant is the man who bought Elegant in 2009, and then obtained for Elegant its brokerage licence: Dmitro Nikiforov. Nikiforov and Tantalit are linked by their joint ownership of investment fund Dominanta. According to Interfax Spark, Nikiforov owned Elegant until March, when ownership passed to a certain Oleksandr Mashtepa, who has no public profile and may be a straw man.

 

But while the Mezhyhirya connection points to the Ukraina shopping mall being now controlled by the extended family of Yanukovych, the trail does not lead to the president’s younger son Oleksandr, who manages most of the core family business. Instead, the trail points to 40-year-old Yanukovych confidante Eduard Stavitsky, minister of natural resources and environment as of April, and previously since 2007 (with short interruptions) the head of Ukraine’s state agency for natural resources, Ukrnadra. It was Ukrnadra under Stavitsky’s direction in September 2007 – the last days of Viktor Yanukovych’s second spell as prime minister – that divested the Mezhyhirya estate to Tantalit, according to documents leaked by the successor Yulia Tymoshenko government in 2009.

 

Stavitsky’s press secretary did not respond to attempts to contact the minister.

 

Interestingly, Elegant Invest and Tanatalit are affiliates of one more company that has recently been the subject of journalist investigations: according to investigations by Ukrainskaya Pravda and tender watchdog Nashi Groshi, obscure company TOV Premier Leasing, set up by the same Dmitro Nikoforov and ‘Styling’ law firm as set up Elegant, in August won tenders held by state railway operators to lease 3,000 freight cars for a total contract volume of UAH5bn (around $700m).

 

Further clues point to Elegant’s Stavitsky connection: The investment fund Dominanta features as co-owners – along with Tantalit and Elegant’s Dmitro Nikiforov – a company registered in Makeevka, Donetsk region, called Kross Kapital. Kross Kapital is located at the same address as a local company, Makeevskii Kombinat Kommunalnykh Predpriyatii (MKKP), which Kross Kapital owns jointly with Maksim Shishlov, formerly chief accountant and member of the board of Stavitsky’s Nadra Ukrainy. According to a Forbes Ukraine investigation published in September, Shislov features as head of Nadra Olesska, a newly-created gas exploration company that was mysteriously cut in on a monster production sharing agreement for Black Sea gasfields signed between Ukraine and Chevron earlier this year – with Ukraine’s chief negotiator being Eduard Stavitsky.

 

Another pointer to Stavitsky may be that the brokerage Zenit – the company that passed the debt claim from Lyndhurst to Elegant Invest – is, on paper, owned and run by a Stavitsky connection called Artem Basmadzhan. Basmadzhan in 2009 was made acting head of Ukraine’s only gold producer, state-owned Zakarpatopolymetally, as the company went into bankruptcy. In an eerie parallel to the story with Ukraina shopping mall, the gold producer was bankrupted in 2009 by a monster debt claimed out of the blue by an offshore company, Cengard Financial, of unknown ownership. Cengard Financial then appointed Dmitro Zaitsev head of the creditors’ committee for the gold producer, and Volodymyr Hurtovoi as the administrator. Both Hurtovoi and Zaitsev are now lawyers for Lyndhurst – and apparently present at the Kyiv January “candid camera” meeting with the Quinns. A clue as to the real owners of Cengard may be that, since becoming natural resource minister, Stavitsky has proposed rebooting Ukraine’s gold production – via purchases by the National Bank of Ukraine (NBU) to boost the country vanishing gold reserves.

Banking arrangements also point to the Ukraina mall moving into the Yanukovych orbit. According to court records, Elegant Invest banks with Bank Globus, a bank that was set up in 2009 and run, and is believed owned, by 37-year-old Valery Prokhorenko, deputy head of the NBU as of 2011, a Yanukovych appointee. Ukraina shopping mall itself changed its bank in December 2011 to Zlatobank, believed owned by Leonid Yurushev, a shadowy banker who grew up with Yanukovych.

 

Finally, one of the judges on the Kyiv arbitration court that has been handling the court cases connected to the Ukraina mall 2011-2012 is Viktoria Dzharty, daughter of deceased Donetsk businessman and politician Vassily Dzharty. It was while Dzharty was Minister of Natural Resources and Environment in the second half of the last decade that Stavitsky was made head of the Natural Resources Agency (Ukrnadra) and he was widely regarded as Dzharty’s creature.

 

Sky Mall up in the air

 

Ukraina is not the only major Kyiv shopping mall whose ownership is in dispute. The Sky Mall – which on completion of its third phase will be Ukraine’s largest, and boast rental income of around $50m per year, compared with Ukraina’s estimated $10m – is also the object of bitter court room disputes, ranging from Ukraine to New York and London, Cyprus and British Virgin Islands.

 

The original developer of Sky Mall was Estonia’s richest man Hilar Teder, co-founder of one of Russia’s largest supermarket chains Okei. In 2010, to raise funds needed to push on with the third phase, Teder sold a 50% + 1 share in Assofit, the Cyrus company that owned the development, to Stockman, an investment group linked to Donetsk businessmen running the oil trader Oledo Petroleum. Teder, however, retained a call option to repurchase the stake by February 2011. As a step towards raising the needed funds, in September 2010 investment bank Dragon Capital took a 30% stake in Teder’s Cyprus ownership vehicle Arricano Trading.

 

But when the time for the call option came round, Teder and Dragon got an unpleasant surprise: Stockman successfully challenged the call option both at the London Court of International Arbitration and at the UN International Trade Tribunal, apparently arguing that Arricano had breached confidentiality agreements, leaving Teder’s Arricano Trading with only a minority stake in the development. In August, Stockman changed management at the mall in a surprise move.

 

Teder may now find it difficult to even hold on to his blocking stake in Sky Mall: according to court records, Dniprovsk Pristan, the Ukrainian ownership vehicle for the Sky Mall, in turn owned by Assofit, was declared insolvent in late August, with a Kyiv court appointing a temporary administrator and freezing assets, which may be a move to squeeze out minorities by transferring assets. The parties involved refused to comment on the story.

 

At the same time, litigation is going on in British Virgin Islands between the Donetsk businesmen behind Stockman. Igor Fillipenko, a name closely linked to the Yanukovych family, is suing Andrei Adamovsky, the name closest linked to Stockman, according to court documents seen by bne.

 

Fillipenko and his business partner Andriy Malitsky are suing for $71.6m, due to the “wrongful appropriation” of Oledo Petroleum and breach of fiduciary trust, perhaps indicating that Adamovksy was originally fronting for Fillipenko in Oledo, but then took things into his own hands. Fillipenko and Malitskiy are claiming for $71.5m, or the Assofit shareholding that holds Sky Mall.

 

Fillipenko shot to prominence in Ukraine when he appeared in 2012 as majority shareholder of Khlib Investbud, now the country’s largest grain trader, which was only set up in 2010 as a state company. Khlib Investbud rose meteorically thanks to wide-reaching formal and informal preferences to displace established global traders such as Bunge and Töpfer on Ukraine’s lucrative grain export market. Journalist investigations have established that Fillipenko is close to Yury Ivanyuschenko, Party of Regions MP and reputedly a close associate of Yanukovych on the make.

 

So Sky Mall would seem to have been pulled into at least the outer reaches of the Yanukovych orbit as well.


Fishy eastern business flourishes in murky UK and Irish waters

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Graham Stack in Kyiv for Business New Europe (www.bne.eu)

December 6, 2012

The British media are following in bne’s footsteps in trying to track down the people who set up UK companies to hide beneficiary ownership – and in doing so are picking up plenty of leads on dodgy Eastern European businessmen.

Picking up on a 2011 investigation by bne, the Organised Crime and Corruption Reporting Project, and Latvia’s Rebaltika, the UK’s Private Eye in November reported on the “thousands of Ukraine-controlled limited liability partnerships created under British company law and subject to near non-existent regulation” that are engaged in “very dubious operations indeed.”

The “Eye”, a British national institution for satire and investigation, visited an empty Cardiff corner shop where 700 abuse-prone limited liability partnerships (LLPs) are registered – with nary a sign of life to be seen. All that a peek through the letterbox revealed was a letter on the doormat from a Ukrainian bank addressed to an obscure UK company Datlux Contracts LLP – a small limited liability partnership that’s exempt from independent auditing, according to Companies House, and with no paper trail besides the forlorn envelope.

But in Ukraine Datlux does have a paper trail, according to bne enquiries – pointing to the umbilical cord between the Cardiff corner shop and Kyiv’s gilded elite. Ukrainian Ministry of Economy records indicate that Datlux has an outstanding debt of $0.25m due to a Ukrainian counterpart TOV Magistral Full, on a contracted consignment of fish that apparently never arrived. Perhaps due to Datlux’s failure to deliver fish consignments paid for, Magistral was bankrupted by a consortium of small banks from which it had raised a total of $5m, according to court records.

Closer examination indicates something smellier than just fish. Magistral is registered at the same address near Kyiv as a branch of Zlato Bank, believed controlled by shadowy oligarch banker Leonid Yurushev (the bank is formally owned and run by one of his top managers). Yurushev, who could not be reached for comment, indeed openly owns a chain of fish supermarkets in Ukraine called Skandinavia.

But the bank address is suggestive that the transaction may have been more about exporting money than importing fish. Fictive import contracts that are paid but never delivered are a classic Ukrainian scam for moving money tax-free out of the country, and the small round sum of $250,000 may look like a classic ‘smurfed’ payment – perhaps the only such payment of a much larger total sum to have got flagged up by the system. British LLPs that are secretly controlled by Ukrainian “importers” are a beloved counterparty for such tax dodges. As a first-world jurisdiction, UK companies do not ring tax inspectors’ alarm bells as do black-listed Caribbean offshores.

Tax evasion may seem run-of-the-mill, but another LLP registered at the same Welsh corner shop triggered a nationwide scandal in Ukraine in 2011 when it was linked to alleged grand corruption put at hundreds of millions of dollars. “Massive corruption by top officials is taking place involving Ukrainian budget funds where money is siphoned off to fictive companies in UK,” claims Ukraine’s jailed former prime minister and leader of the opposition Yulia Tymoshenko, in a report she filed from her prison cell to the Financial Action Task Force, the global anti-money laundering watchdog, in May 2012.

According to Tymoshenko’s report, Ukraine’s government in 2011 paid anonymous intermediaries around 60% over market prices for a drilling platform and supply vessels intended for use in the Black Sea – purchased from a UK intermediary Highway Investment Processing LLP, registered at the Cardiff corner shop. The report argues that Ukraine’s state energy company Naftogaz bought a drilling rig from Highway Investment in 2011 for $400m that Highway Investment itself sourced for just under $250m from Norwegian offshore operator Seadrill. The UK company reported just under £300,000 profit for 2011 to the UK authorities.

Under the regulatory radar

While this corner shop address may be in Wales, the man pulling the strings to set up the UK LLPs registered at the address has been based in Dublin, Ireland for the last two decades, as described by Organised Crime and Corruption Reporting Project and the Baltic Center for Investigative Journalism in 2011.

According to documents seen by bne, it was a certain Philip Burwell and his company International Overseas Services that set up the companies at the Welsh address, including Highway Investment in 2008, using Latvian nominee directors Erik Vanagels, Stan Gorin and Danny Bangers. “Irish businessmen are the Ukrainians’ conduit into the UK,” writesPrivate Eye, with reference to the 2011 investigation. In fact, the “Irishman” is actually a blithe Aussie: Burwell took Irish nationality and moved to Ireland at the end of the 1980s when Ireland was itself an offshore zone. And one further advantage: Irish nationality allows him to alternate between the English spelling of his name and the Irish Pilib Boireil.

Burwell and his company IOS was also pinpointed in November 2012 by a massive joint investigation by theGuardian and BBC Panorama programme into the people setting up anonymous UK companies for dodgy businessmen using nominee directors. But in Dublin regulators are looking the other way. “The Anti-Money Laundering Compliance Unit has no record of company service provider International Overseas Services,” says Ireland’s Department of Justice.

International Overseas Services flies below the radar in Ireland, but not so in Ukraine. Until exposed by journalist investigations in 2011, the company’s Kyiv office was located a stone’s throw from Ukraine’s notoriously corrupt parliament and government, making it easy for officials to do business there.

While the Ukrainian clients have partly consisted of tax dodgers and embezzlers for two decades, most worrying is that Burwell has established numerous UK companies on behalf of Ukraine arms traders – such as a shipment of Ukrainian tanks to South Sudan in 2008 on the MS Faina that was seized by Somali pirates – as well as traders of nuclear equipment, according to documents seen by bne.

Burwell’s connections to Ukraine’s notorious arms export operations stretch right back to the 1990s, when Ukraine supplied and transported much of the weaponry that fueled the horrendous civil war in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), that cost over five million lives. Burwell was and is co-director of Irish company East/West Alliance Ltd, set up in the 1990s by Ukrainian air cargo magnate, Anatoly Liovin, as an offshore adjunct to Liovin’s cargo airline ATI.

The records of Uganda’s Porter Commission that investigated the plundering of DRC during the 1990s civil war – with arms flown in and precious minerals exported – show Liovin’s ATI to have been one of the main aviation operators flying between the war zone and Entebbe in Uganda. But in 2009, thanks to his Irish company co-directed by Burwell, Liovin persuaded Member of European Parliament Gay Mitchell to file a parliamentary question to the European Commission on his behalf: pressuring Ukraine’s government to return planes confiscated from him in a domestic tax dispute. Liovin has denied any involvement in illegal activities.

Burwell also denies systematic involvement in the arms trade. “There’s always going to be one or two bad ones,” Burwell says of his Ukrainian clients, while averring he does background research on all his clients “on the internet”.

Lavo, lavare, Latvia

The crucial link between Ukraine and the UK/Ireland is Latvia, with banks in the small Baltic country laundering dirty post-Soviet money looking to move west. Burwell’s IOS set up business in Dublin in the year that the Soviet Union collapsed in league with Latvia’s first and largest commercial bank Parex – a bank which became synonymous with money-laundering across the former Soviet Union until it went to the wall in November 2008 under the impact of the world financial crisis.

In an interview in 2011, Burwell acknowledged “being close” to the former owners of the bank, Valerijis Kargins and Viktors Krasovickis. The network continues running flawlessly even after the demise of Parex, indicating both that the Parex network is still active but now simply using other Latvian and Lithuanian banks to channel dirty funds.

Irish regulators are also in denial about the Latvian link. “We have no information about money-laundering activities by Latvian banks in Ireland,” says the Department of Justice.

At least one Irishman disagrees. Michael J. Bourke was head of Latvia’s Rietumu Bank, in which Irish magnate Desmond Dermot holds a stake, for over ten years. Now he is in charge of Latvian efforts to retrieve assets owned by Parex, including from the former owners. “Burwell is the director of companies that received loans from Parex that we believe were hidden loans to the former owners of Parex,” Bourke says.

Ireland’s very own asset recovery bank- the Irish Bank Resolution Corporation – is hurting over failure to gain control over Kyiv’s Ukraina shopping mall, now it seems controlled by top Ukrainian politicians. But when it comes to missing assets, Ukraine – and Latvia – have plenty reason of their own to complain about Ireland.


Как американцы помогали министру Бойко

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http://economics.lb.ua/state/2012/08/13/165377_uchastie_halliburton_korruptsionnom.html

“Нафтогаз” утверждает, что Halliburton (мировая компания-гигант в области оказания сервисных услуг для нефте- и газодобывающих компаний) назвала оправданной цену в $400 млн за буровую установку, которую украинская компания закупила в 2011 году. Но расследование BNE показывает, что оценка Halliburton меньше, чем кажется на первый взгляд. И что американская фирма-субподрядчик из Алабамы, которую нанял Halliburton, работала как человек-оркестр.

Фото: neftegaz.ru
Halliburton подписала соглашение с Нафтогазом

В 2011 году национальная энергетическая компания “Нафтогаз Украины” закупила плавучую буровую установку почти за $400 млн у британской компании-посредника, который купил ту же установку всего за $248,5 млн у норвежской Seadrill. Расхождение между ценами породило громкие обвинения в коррупции в крупных масштабах (издание “Зеркало недели” использовало для этого скандала меткое название “вышка Бойко” – по имени министра энергетики и сторонника Партии регионов Юрия Бойко, - LB.ua). Эти обвинения могут повлиять на результаты парламентских выборов в Украине 28 октября 2012 года.

В ответ “Нафтогаз” и чиновники из министрства энергетики говорят, что компания Halliburton подтвердила цену буровой вышки в $400 млн, и что это снимает с них все подозрения.

Согласно письму Halliburton, которое видел журналист BNE, оценочная стоимость установки, оборудования, инженерных работ и транспортировки вышки из Сингапура в Черном море почти в точности совпадает с суммой $400 млн, которые “Нафтогаз” выложил победителю сомнительного тендера 2011 года. Победителем была британская компания Highway Investment Processing, собственников которой так и не удалось отыскать. Банковский счет компании, на который были переведены средства, был открыт в латвийском Trasta Komercbanka.

Теперь “Нафтогаз” и Минэнергетики размахивают письмом Halliburton как доказательством того, что траты на приобретение буровой установки были оправданы. “Процедура приобретения буровой платформы, ее обслуживание и технологические процессы являются объектами независимого аудита со стороны Halliburton”, – заявил заместитель правления “Нафтогаз” Вадим Чупрун.

Вадим Чупрун ссылается на оценку Halliburton
Фото: ua-energy.org
Вадим Чупрун ссылается на оценку Halliburton

Министерство энергетики Украины распространило такое сообщение: “Мы считаем, что дальнейшие инсинуации о покупке буровых установок являются инструментом конкурентной борьбы за добычу на шельфе Черного моря, который направлен на снижение энергетической безопасности Украины”.

Sweet Home Alabama

(дословно “Милый дом Алабама”. Автор использовал для подзаголовка строчку из песни американской рок-группы Lynyrd Skynyrd. В этой же песне, кстати, упомянут “Вотергейтский скандал” – политический кризис в США, возникший после газетной публикации в The Washington Post и приведший к отставке президента Риачарда Никсона, -LB.ua)

Письмо Halliburton, которое цитировал “Нафтогаз”, написано на плохом английском языке и содержит орфографические и фактические ошибки. Тем не менее в Halliburton подтвердили BNE его подлинность.

Письмо, однако, не может оправдывать “Нафтогаз”. В нем говорится, что Halliburton наняла для проведения оценки тендера компанию Marine Surveyors Incorporated, которая включает в себя команду под руководством некоего капитана Майкла Барри.

Но по данным BNE, Halliburton вводит нас в заблуждение. Никакой Marine Surveyors Incorporated не существует. Компания Halliburton наняла лично капитана Майкла Барри: M.H.Barrie & Associates Marine Surveyors, Inc. По словам Барри, он сам, без какой либо команды, отправился в турецкий черноморский порт для проведения оценки.

Запросы BNE говорят, что морской инспектор капитан Барри Майкл с 1994 года ведет небольшой бизнес в американском портовом городе Мобил, штат Алабама. В 1998 году у Барри появились партнеры. Барри работает в четырехкомнатном номере в блоке офисных помещений, общая численность сотрудников его компании не превышает десять человек.

На своем веб-сайте капитан Барри предлагает “морскую и грузовую экспертизу” с “знанием местных портовых операций”. M.H.Barrie & Associates Marine Surveyors, Inc занимается “оценкой состояние суден и грузов для страхования и требований о возмещении ущерба”.

Сайт Барри Майкла не обновлялся семь лет

Сайт Барри не упоминает опыта работы в оценке стоимости буровых установок. Барри сообщил BNE, что за последние два года он действительно брался за оценку самоподъемных буровых установок, и что его сайт уже семь лет не обновлялся. Барри признал, что он управляет “маленькой компанией”, и что это была первая работа, которую он делал для Halliburton. Барри также сказал, что Halliburton запретили ему давать комментарии по поводу проведенной для них работы, но он подтвердил, что был ознакомлен с письмом, которое приводит в свою защиту “Нафтогаз”.

Halliburton запретили ему давать комментарии по поводу проведенной для них работы.

Halliburton является второй по величине в мире нефтесервисной компанией с рыночной капитализацией $30 млрд и штатом в более 60 000 работников. Компанией руководит бывший в 1990 году вице-президентом США Дик Чейни. Пресс-служба Halliburton ответила на BNE запрос об оценке буровой вышки West Juno (переименована в “Петр Годованец”), что сможет предоставить свой ответ в течение двухнедельного срока (ответа так и не последовало, -LB.ua).

Непонятно, зачем Halliburton понадобилось нанимать Барри. Но еще более непонятны некоторые строки письма, которое показали украинские власти. Хотя большую часть разницы между ценой продажи вышки норвежской Seadrill ($248,5 млн) и ценой покупки вышки “Нафтогазом” ($400 млн) заплатил посредник из Великобритании, “Нафтогаз” описывает эти расходы как свои собственные. То есть, исходя из текста письма, “по уточненным данным “Нафтогаза” (!) работы по модернизации на буровой вышке West Juno (!) оцениваются в $57,94 млн”.

Во-вторых, “на основе объемов работ до сухой буксировки вышки по просьбе “Нафтогаза” вспомогательные расходы на инженерные работы, например, обрезку и переустановку опор, плату персоналу и инженерные работы (!) были оценены в $ 71,38 млн”. Этот пункт относится к работе, которая была проделана для перевозки буровой через Босфор в Черное море. Интересно, что письмо Halliburton датировано ноябрем 2011 года. То есть оно было было написано до этих инженерных работ, которые реализованы зимой с 2011 на 2012 год, и до того, как Барри посетил установку в апреле 2012 года.

Письмо Halliburton датировано ноябрем 2011 года. То есть оно было было написано до этих инженерных работ.

“Нафтогаз” не ответил на запрос BNE о том, насколько оценка Halliburton была основана на данных самого “Нафтогаза”.

Интересно, что первоначальный договор между “Нафтогазом” и британским посредником Highway Investment, подписанный в марте 2011 года и прочитанный позже журналистом BNE, указывал местом доставки буровой установки Сингапур, а не Черное море. Таким образом, цена инженерных работ, связанных с транзитом буровой установки через Босфор ($71,28 млн), и транспортные расходы в размере $15 млн не были включены в первоначальную сделку между “Нафтогазом” и  Highway Investment в марте 2011 года. Место поставки вышки было изменено с Сингапура на турецкий черноморский порт Гиресун в поправках к договору в сентябре 2011 года, в чем убедился журналист BNE. Одним росчерком пера были внесены изменения стоимостью более $86 млн дополнительных расходов для Highway Investment, но без финансовых последствий для “Нафтогаза”.

Затраты посредника на лоставку вышки Бойко выросли на $86 млн в одно мгновение
Фото: denizhaber.com.tr
Затраты посредника на лоставку вышки Бойко выросли на $86 млн в одно мгновение

В сентябре 2011 года Halliburton подписал рамочное соглашение с “Нафтогазом” о строительстве, эксплуатации и техническом обслуживании нефтяных и газовых скважин. В том числе это касалось и обслуживания буровой вышки West Juno (“Петр Годованец”). Это соглашение было признаком стремительного взлета бизнеса Halliburton в Украине в 2011 году, который открыл шикарный новый офис в престижном районе Киева. Письмо Halliburton, написанное в ноябре 2011 года, заканчивается на высокой ноте: “Halliburton ценит возможность предоставить этот предварительный доклад и с нетерпением ожидает новой возможности партнерства с “Нафтогазом” в разработке нефтяных и газовых активов в Украине».

Аналитики предполагают, что Halliburton в настоящее время потеснил компанию Schlumberger, которую “Нафтогаз” выбрал своим основным сервисным партнером. Еще в 2006 году, Schlumberger, крупнейшая в мире сервисная компания в сфере нефте- и газодобычи и традиционный конкурент Halliburton, подписала соглашение о стратегическом сотрудничестве с “Нафтогазом”. В конце декабря 2010 Schlumberger выиграл тендер “Нафтогаза” на работы по Субботинскому месторождению. Schlumberger сообщил BNE, что “мы не можем подтвердить, что они [прежние договоренности] до сих пор действительны”.

Переписывая историю

История переписывается не только в Украине по отношению к сделкам “Нафтогаза” по закупке буровой установки в 2011 году. Доходы посредника от продажи буровой West Juno “Нафтогазу” прошли через оффшорные счета в латвийском Trasta Komercbanka. То есть через счета банка, который, возможно, связан с “Нафтогазом”. Не в последнюю очередь такую связь подтверждает тот факт, что крупнейший акционер и председатель совета банка Игорь Буймистер в своей биографии на сайте банка пишет, что является консультантом набсовета компании Neftgas Ukraine (российское звучание “Нафтогаза”). А также консультантом компании Devon, которую создали украинский “Нафтогаз” и польская компания PGNiG.

Прокуратура Латвии займется сомнительными сделками, которые проходили через Trasta Komercbanka
Фото: delfi.lv
Прокуратура Латвии займется сомнительными сделками, которые проходили через Trasta Komercbanka

Сейчас на сайте банка Trasta удалены ссылки на украинские компании из биографии Буймистера. После удаления ссылок банк потребовал, чтобы BNE отказался от своих предыдущих заявлений о связи Буймистера с “Нафтогазом”.

Банк теперь, после удаления ссылок, утверждает, что ссылка на Neftgas Ukraine не является ссылкой на украинский “Нафтогаз”. Якобы Neftgas Ukraine — некая частная компания. Но несмотря на все запросы BNE, банк не предоставил журналистам адреса или других сведений об этой частной компани Neftgas Ukraine.

Также база данных Interfax Spark (подробная база данных коммерческих компаний, которую ведет российское информационное агентство Interfax) не содержит информации о такой или подобной компании. Банк также ничего не говорит об участии Буймистера в работе компании Devon, которая уж точно создана “Нафтогазом”. Но зато сайт щедро сохранил ссылки на “докторантуру” Буймистера в Kennedy Western University — неаккредитованного в США колледжа, который занимается дистанционным обучением, и который был закрыт в 2009 году после того как был назван в правительственном расследовании США “фабрикой по производству дипломов” (дословно “мельницей дипломов”, – “diploma mills”,  - LB.ua).

Игорь Буймистер имеет диплом колледжа, который закрыли в США со скандалом, и отрицает свою связь с Нафтогазом

Нервозность банка очевидна ввиду того, что латвийские правоохранительные органы наконец-то начали расследовать результаты сомнительных тендеров “Нафтогаза” в 2011 году и последующее прохождение денег через Латвию. BNE получил подтверждение от ОБЭП латвийской полиции, что расследование продолжается, и что следующим этапом расследования будет передача материалов дела по отмыванию денег в офис Генпрокурора уже в этом году.

Грустный конец торгов

Мы можем спорить о честности тендеров “Нафтогаза” в 2011 году до бесконечности. Но скоро и этого не будет, ведь в Украине был принят закон, который делает информацию о тендерах госкомпаний недоступной для журналистов и удобной для чиновников. Будь этот закон раньше, траты “Нафтогаза” в 2011 году в размере около $1 млрд на закупку двух самоподъемных буровых установок и судов обеспечения так и остались бы секретом. Эти сделки никогда бы не оказались в центре внимания общественности.

Президент Украины Виктор Янукович, во время правления которого прошли сомнительные тендеры “Нафтогаза”, подписал закон 1 августа. Он внес поправки в процедуру государственных закупок, освобождая государственные компании, такие как “Нафтогаз”, от проведения тендеров по закупкам. Тем самым он фактически устранил любую форму общественного контроля за огромной частью государственного сектора. Правительство утверждает, что обязательные тендеры замедляют процесс закупок и препятствуют конкурентоспособности государственных компаний на международных рынках.

Президент Виктор Янукович подписал закон, который уводит в тень миллиарды долларов
Фото: Макс Левин
Президент Виктор Янукович подписал закон, который уводит в тень миллиарды долларов

Но по словам Алексея Шалайского, основателя сайта “Наші гроші”, который следит за государственными тендерами на наличие коррупции, и который первым заметил сомнительный тендер “Нафтогаза” в 2011 году, новый закон уничтожит ряд государственных тендеров. “На госкомпании приходится около $37 млрд государственных трат из общего количества в $62 млрд”, – говорит Шалайский. “Теперь им не надо проводить тендеры. Мы подсчитали, что минимальный уровень отката вырастет до 10%, что означает, по крайней мере, что еще $3,7 млрд будет украдено”.

Еще $3,7 млрд будет украдено.

По словам Шалайского, сайт “Наші гроші” добился отмены 25-и тендеров за год работы. В результате более $700 млн будут возвращены в казну. “Все эти торги были отменены исключительно благодаря давлению со стороны СМИ. Никаких юридических недостатков в процедуре проведения тендеров не было обнаружено, но после давления журналистов, победители тендеров сами вышли из сделки”, – говорит Шалайский.

Давление СМИ усиливал независимый критический телеканал ТВі, на котором выходила передача Tender News, нацеленная на коррупцию в сфере государственных закупок. В том числе и на тендеры “Нафтогаза”. В середине июля власти сделали предупредительный выстрел по ТВі, возбудив уголовное дело против генерального директора компании по обвинению в уклонении от налогов. Обвинения были официально объявлены 2 августа — на следующий день после внесения изменений в законы о тендерах (прокуратура также возбудилауголовное дело, направленное против LB.ua, – ред.).

После ликвидации обязательных тендеров Шалайский ожидает дальнейшего роста коррупции: “Самые коррупционные сделки были приостановлены в ожидании последних поправок к закону”.


Структуры, близкие к Януковичу, заподозрили в захвате универмага “Украина”

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http://economics.lb.ua/trades/2012/11/26/180239_yanukovicha_zapodozrili_zahvate.html

 

Структуры, близкие к Януковичу, заподозрили в захвате универмага "Украина"
Здание в центре Киева отобрали у ирландских собственников.

Среди новых владельцев киевского универмага «Украина» появилась структура, которая обслуживает интересы Президента Виктора Януковича и близких ему людей.

Об этом в издании Business New Europe пишет британский журналист Грэхем Стэк.

Он отмечает, что универмаг «Украина», который оценивается в $78 млн с годовым доходом $10 млн, получил финансовое требование уплатить $45 млн долга в пользу неизвестной структуры Lyndhurst Development Trading SA. Произошло это после того, как владелец универмага (92,75%) – ирландский миллиардер Шон Куин – был признан банкротом, и его активы начали арестовываться кредиторами, в том числе ирландским банком IBRC.

На судебных заседаниях Шон Куин утверждал, что из-за сомнительных решений украинских судов он потерял контроль над собственностью в пользу украинских партнеров. Одним из шагов, который привел к потере контроля, стало требование уплатить $45 млн.

Между тем киевские хозяйственный и апелляционный хозяйственный суды признали, чтовладелец «Украины» – Quinn Holdings Sweden AB - должен все же выплатить Lyndhurst Development Trading $45 млн. Впоследствии в результате сложной цепочки с ценными бумагами этот долг был переуступлен таинственной брокерской компании «Зенит», а потом – не менее загадочной – «Элегант Инвест».

Оказалось, однако, что «Элегант инвест» является аффилированной структурой с ООО «Танталит», на землях которого находится резиденция «Межигорье». Связью между этими структурами является Дмитрий Никифоров, который приобрел в 2009 году «Элегант инвест».

Никифоров и «Танталит» связаны общим владением инвестиционным фондом «Доминанта». Согласно данным «Интерфакс-СПАРК», Никифоров владел «Элегант Инвестом» вплоть до марта, когда его заменил некий Александр Маштепа, данных о котором в публичном пространстве нет, и который может быть подставным лицом.

Другие связи новых владельцев универмага «Украина» выводят на одного из ближайших друзей Януковича – министра охраны окружающей природной среды Эдуарда Ставицкого.

Фонд «Доминанта» вместе с «Танталитом» и Никифором являются совладельцами макеевского «Кросс капитала». Находится «Кросс капитал» по тому же адресу, что и «Макеевский комбинат коммунальных предприятий». Владельцами последнего являются «Кросс капитал» и экс-бухгалтер «Надра Украины» Максим Шишлов. Сейчас Шишлов возглавляет «Надра Олесска».

Путь к Ставицкому можно проследить и через брокерскую фирму «Зенит». Ею владеет и управляет Артем Басмаджан. В 2009 году он был и.о. руководителя государственной компании «Закарпатполиметаллы». Эта компания обанкротилась в связи с огромным финансовым требованием со стороны никому не известного офшора – Cengard Financial. Комитет кредиторов тогда возглавил Дмитрий Зайцев, администратором комитета был Владимир Гуртовой. И Зайцев, и Гуртовой теперь являются адвокатами Lyndhurst Development Trading, которая и инициировала проблемы в универмаге «Украина».

В декабре 2011 году, сразу после решения украинского суда, «Украина» сменила банковские счета. Теперь она их держит в «Златобанке», принадлежащем одному из давних соратников Януковича Леониду Юрушеву.

Наконец, «Элегант Инвест» и «Танталит», согласно расследованиями в Украине, аффилированы с еще одной теперь известной структурой – ООО «Премьер-Лизинг», которая выиграла на тендерах «Укрзализныци» $700 млн.


Latvia to probe controversial supplier to Ukraine’s Naftogaz

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Graham Stack in Zhitomir, Ukraine for Business New Europe (www.bne.eu)
January 17, 2013

Latvia has officially confirmed that it opened a criminal investigation into Highway Investment Processing, a UK shell company that controversially sold a $400m drilling rig to Ukraine’s energy giant Naftogaz Ukrainy in 2011 after purchasing it for only $248.5m from Norway’s Seadrill.

The criminal case could cause a major headache for Naftogaz and officials linked to the deal, just as the national gas company enters into a potentially crucial year with mounting pressure from Russia and a tightening domestic budget situation. And bne enquiries point to things being even worse than they first appear.

In 2011, Highway Investment sold an offshore drilling platform to Ukraine’s largest company, state-owned energy giant Naftogaz, for $400m, having purchased it for $248.5m from Norway’s offshore driller Seadrill. The huge mark-up prompted widespread allegations of corruption domestically and internationally, but Latvia is the only country until now to have launched a criminal investigation, prompted by Highway Investment having a bank account at Latvia’s Trasta Komercbanka.

bne in June quoted sources in Latvia’s economic crime department that an investigation into Highway Investment had been opened. Now there is official confirmation: according to Latvia’s police spokesman on December 12, “in connection with the purchase by Ukrainian company (Naftogaz subsidiary) Chornomornaftogaz of a jack-up drilling platform on March 1, 2011, on May 16 2012 the economic crime section of the main directory of criminal police of Latvia’s state police initiated criminal investigation N11816009312 into the legalisation of funds obtained by criminal means.”

Back in March 2011, the Highway Investment deal kicked off a Naftogaz spending splurge ostensibly aimed at increasing Ukraine’s energy security by tapping reserves on the Black Sea shelf – but which may have achieved exactly the opposite: by saddling the strategically crucial, but financially challenged company with huge debts and mounting due-diligence questions.

The conclusions of the Latvian investigation as to the rights and wrongs of the initial March 2011 tender will thus bear on appraisal of all the company’s subsequent procurement for the Black Sea drilling campaign – now at over $2bn and rising. Ironically, for a project that aims to secure energy independence from Russian gas supplies, the only international funding to date has come from Russia: in November, Russian state-owned bank Sberbank announced it had opened a $58m revolving credit line for Chornomornaftogaz.

While expecting the worst, Latvian investigators may still be surprised by what they find on the Highway Investment books. According to bne enquiries, Highway Investment was not just a special purpose vehicle for the Naftogaz and Seadrill deals, but was already operating as a full-blown money-laundering platform at the time of the March 2011 tender.

Further, bne can reveal that the Latvian investigation is not the only criminal investigation with a bearing on Highway Investment. Ukraine has launched a crackdown on the activity of “conversion centres” – money-laundering operations that “convert” booked company funds into “black cash” via fictive contracts with fictive companies – and in doing so it has unwittingly spilt the beans on some of the forces behind Highway Investment.

Highway robbery

Highway Investment was set up in December 2008, with a certain Pavel Dvulichanskii as its director (holding power of attorney) and a bank account at Latvia’s Trasta Kommercbanka, a bank that has been linked to Ukraine’s former energy minister Yury Boiko.

Despite the company looking like a special purpose vehicle set up for the Naftogaz tender, bne was able to track down one payment made to Highway Investment completely outside of the Naftogaz-Seadrill deal: a small Zhitomir printing company Skerzo paid Highway Investment €270,000 for a second-hand offset press in November 2010. Skerzo subsequently took Highway Investment to court in 2011 when Highway failed to deliver the printer despite the money having moved abroad – violating Ukraine’s foreign currency regulation laws.

Skerzo is owned by Oleg Karpeka, CEO of Zhitomir Cardboard Plant (ZKK). Karpeka co-owns ZKK with Lugansk mining magnate Igor Lisky. A bne reporter, posing under cover as a British businessman, spoke to Dmitry Karpeka, brother of Oleg, about the payments made to Highway Investment.

To suspicious minds, the failed ZKK transaction looks like a typical fictive contract designed to move money abroad. But according to Dmitry Karpeka, the company really did order a printing press from a German company. Highway Investment, he explains, was used as a payment vehicle for the printer “to avoid the excessive Ukrainian paperwork and taxes”. When the Germany company failed to deliver the goods, the money was returned to ZKK minus 20%, which the German company retained for having processed the order. According to Karpeka, the subsequent court case with Highway Investment in Zhitomir was a mere formality required by Ukraine’s foreign currency regulations – accounting for the fact that Highway Investment was represented at the Zhitomir court by ZKK’s own chief engineer, Oleksandr Ergidzei, as shown in the document below.

Karpeka said that the Highway Investment director Pavel Dvulichanskii was a businessman from Lugansk, and when shown a photo from the Facebook page of a businessman of that name from Lugansk, he positively identified him. Karpeka said that Dvulichanskii was a connection of Lisky’s and that the Highway Investment payment arrangement was Lisky’s idea.

Lisky, however, told bne that this was not the case. “The transaction with Highway Investment was made by the printing company Skerzo, which is wholly owned by Oleg Karpeko, and to which I have no relationship at all,” he told bne. Lisky said, however, it seemed to him that Highway Investment had indeed been a “platform for black market transactions.” Lisky denied knowing anything about Dvulichanksii.

ergidzei power of attorney zhitomir highway clean highway dvulichanskii power of attorney

Janus-faced Dvulichanskii

But bne established that the Zhitomir cardboard plant (ZKK) had other relations with Dvulichanskii besides the non-resident company Highway Investment. Dvulichanskii – an unusual name which literally means “Janus-faced” – is not only the director of the UK company Highway Investment, but of another of ZKK’s counterparties, this time a Ukrainian one.

According to a case brought against the company by the tax police in 2012, ZKK purported to have purchased paper waste and chemicals in 2010-11 from a Lugansk private company Oriens PP, of which Dvulichanskii has been director since 2010. According to the tax police, these contracts with Oriens were fictive and solely for the purpose of tax evasion through reducing profits.

The tax service alleged in court that Dvulichanskii’s company Oriens is “a member of a single financial-industrial group that was created for the provision of tax minimisation services, for the conversion of funds (into cash), and for the creation of VAT credits to reduce VAT payments.” According to the tax police, Oriens is a fictive company with no staff, office or storage premises, and is one of tens of Lugansk fictive companies used in the conversion centre. Court records show that ZKK made payments to other companies alleged to be involved in the conversion centre as well. The tax service ordered ZKK to pay over $1m in back taxes. ZKK is contesting the claim in court.

Lisky told bne that the tax charges resulted from his support for the opposition party ‘Front Zmin’. However, according to the tax police, the conversion centre’s customers comprise scores of industrial companies concentrated in East Ukraine, including for instance mines owned by the Sadovaya Group, listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange. Court records show alone Dvulichanskii’s Oriens to be accused of fictive transactions with over ten other plants besides ZKK.

The fact that tax police name a Ukrainian company headed by Dvulichanskii, and receiving payments from ZKK, as part of a conversion centre points to Highway Investment also being part of the conversion centre – and likely receiving payments from other clients of the conversion centre besides ZKK.

The Interfax Spark database shows that Dvulichanskii has had ownership stakes in two other companies – Ukrmagistral-2008 and Ukroptmagistralnik. Both companies are registered at the same Lugansk address and telephone number as Oriens.

Dvulichanskii himself denied any knowledge of the Ukrainian or UK companies to bne. His day job is as a broker of fencing and weightlifting equipment for Lugansk producer Dynamoblade. However the phone number provided for the Lugansk “fictive” companies in the state register matches the mobile number provided for Dvulichanskii’s work at Dynamoblade, indicating he may indeed be an employee of the conversion centre rather than a mere “strawman”. Ukraine’s tax service is prosecuting the directors of other companies it claims were part of the same conversion centre, but it is unclear whether there are proceedings against Dvulichanskii himself.

Oriens page 1

Akta Bank and the Baltics

Interestingly, all the three Lugansk companies where Dvulichanskii has figured as director and/or owner, including Oriens, have had bank accounts at the same tiny Dnepropetrovsk-based bank, Akta Bank, according to court cases and bankruptcy announcements. This suggests Akta Bank’s links to Dvulichanskii and to the conversion centre uncovered by the tax police – as well as potentially to the UK company Highway Investment.

The Akta Bank connection to Highway dovetails with evidence pointing to Akta Bank’s interaction with other non-resident companies with bank accounts at Baltic banks.

Akta Bank was established only in 2008 by Dnepropetrovsk businessman Vadim Ermolaev, owner of Alef Corporation, which has interests in real estate, agriculture and alcohol. Within a year of it being founded, then head of Ukraine’s security service SBU Valentin Navailachenko named the bank with five others as being involved in large-scale money-laundering in the form of conversion services. According to the findings of a National Bank of Ukraine (NBU) inspection of the bank in 2009, as leaked to weekly Zerkalo Nedeli in 2010, the bank had been selling around $10m and €5m in cash on a daily basis to the same four “individuals”.

Akta Bank both now and in the past has denied any connection to the activities of conversion centres and money-laundering, and says all such reports are the result of paid smear campaigns launched by competitors.

In 2010, there were further revelations about Akta Bank. When in September 2010 the hryvnia suddenly slipped against the dollar, the NBU publicly said this was due to a spike in purchases of hard currency “by the population”. But NBU officials leaked documents to weekly Zerkalo Nedeli in late September 2010, apparently showing that Akta Bank – which had at the time only ten branches – had apparently sold a staggering $1.2bn of hard currency to the population for hryvnia in the first nine months of the year – which would make it astonishingly the second largest seller of hard currency to the population, after the country’s largest bank, Privatbank, despite being only 60th largest in terms of assets.

If the Zerkalo Nedeli figures were true, where could Akta Bank have sourced the hard currency funds? Ukrainian court records suggest Akta Bank is linked to massive money flows from Baltic banks. From August to December 2010, according to court records, a New Zealand company Anglo Stand Ltd transferred €100m and $30m to a Ukrainian brassplate company in Kharkiv region, as “non-refundable financial assistance”. The New Zealand company transferred the funds from its account at Lithuania’s Ukio Bank, to the Ukrainian company, Global Distribution AG’s account at Akta Bank. According to the court records, the Akta Bank branch in Kyiv then paid out the entire €100m and $30m in cash to the director of Global Distribution over a period of four months, ostensibly to purchase agricultural produce. The tax police investigators identified this as a money-laundering operation.

Given that the NBU documents obtained by Zerkalo Nedeli show Akta Bank selling $1.2bn in hard currency for cash January-September 2010, the Anglo Stand Ltd. transfer may have been only one of over ten such transfers in the course of 2010.

Akta Bank’s press officer said it was too early to comment on the ongoing Global Distribution court case and too late to comment on the 2010 Zerkalo Nedeli report.

The Baltic connection is used by major operators of conversion centres to hide from law-enforcement the link between the clients’ wired funds to the conversion centre and the off-the-books cash that clients receive in return, minus commissions.

conversion center and highway

Friends in high places

Akta Bank’s owner, Vadim Ermolaev, is the business partner of a powerful Ukrainian political clan with links to the Naftogaz deals, which may account for Highway Investment being used as the vehicle for the controversial Naftogaz tender.

The clan was headed by Vassily Dzharti, a confidante of President Viktor Yanukovych and long-serving Party of Regions natural resources minister. Yanukovych made Dzharti governor of the Crimea – home of Chornomoreneftagaz – in 2010. Dzharti died suddenly in August 2011. Dzharti’s protege Eduard Stavitskii held the post of natural resources minister – until being made energy minister with oversight of Naftogaz in December 2012.

In late 2010, early 2011, at the same time as the Naftogaz-Highway-Seadrill deal was in the making, Ermolaev was in talks with the Dzharti group over the privatisation of the assets of Nikopol Pipe Plant, a key supplier of non-rusting pipes for the nuclear power and aerospace sector, which had defaulted on a loan agreement with Akta Bank. In February 2011 – the same month as the Naftogaz tender – the Kyiv commercial court acknowledged Ermolaev’s claim to the pipe plant assets and ordered their transfer to Ermolaev’s structure Oskar. Dzharti’s daughter Viktoria sits as deputy chairman of the court. Viktoria Dzharti’s husband, Valery Omelchenko, then  took a 25% stake in Oskar via his Austrian vehicle Wellmind Investment, as detailed by a Forbes Ukraine investigation.

According to Esa Ikaheimonen, the former CFO of Norwegian offshore driller Seadrill, the company which sold the drilling platform to Highway Investment in April 2011, the deal could proceed very quickly – with talks starting in December 2010 and the deal announced April 2011 – where the purchasing company could show it had the necessary funds at the ready. This , together with the fact that the initial funds on the Highway Investment accounts may have been effectively untraceable since they originate from a multitude of transactions similar to the ZKK transaction, may account for using the company as a vehicle for the deal.

The investigation points to Highway Investment being a sibling of other notorious platform companies run by Baltic banks and Ukrainian counterparties, such as Tormex Limited, which a US court named as a laundering-money outfit for Mexico’s Sinaloa cartel. This makes Highway an unusual choice of business partner not only for Naftogaz, but especially for a $19bn US-listed company like Seadrill.


Baltic banks at the “Hearts” of Ukraine graft

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Graham Stack in Kyiv for Business New Europe

January 23, 2013

There may be fewer bigger followers of Heart of Midlothian FC in Ukraine than Zhitomir local Anatoly Rupeta, but his enthusiasm for the Scottish football club is waning. Rupeta is facing a lengthy jail sentence after being stitched up, as he claims, by a gang of Ukrainian money-launderers operating via Lithuanian bank Ukio Bankas, owned by Vladimir Romanov, who also since 2005 has owned the venerable Edinburgh team.

“Hearts were always my favourite Scottish club because they have the same colours as Zhitomir. I don’t know how directly Romanov himself is implicated in my problems, perhaps he is too involved at Hearts to follow what is going on at his bank, but I call on him to prevent a terrible miscarriage of justice,” Rupeta tells bne in a cafe in his native Zhitomir, a regional centre of 250,000 people about two hours drive from Kyiv.

Rupeta is facing a 10-14 year jail sentence if found guilty on what he says are trumped-up charges. But despite four years of legal proceedings now drawing to a close, the spruce 54-year-old looks younger than his age, and is calm and collected when talking about his case – and curious to see what a Brit makes of it. As befits a former bank manager, he has put together an impressive array of documents and testimony supporting his arguments.

Rupeta’s account raises questions about the real business activities of the East European businessmen who have invested in British football. It also dovetails with a body of evidence that home-grown Baltic banking is linked to dirty money from the former Soviet countries. These questions became more pressing after the arrest of Romanov’s colleague both in British football and in Baltic banking, Vladimir Antonov, on asset-stripping charges in 2012. Lithuanian authorities nationalised Antonov’s bank Snoras due to major regulatory violations in 2011, shortly after Antonov had purchased the English football club Portsmouth. Lithuania also in January became the latest country – following Switzerland, Latvia and Cyprus – to open an investigation into how its banks might have been involved in the “Magnitsky case”. Named after the lawyer who uncovered it but died in prison under suspicious circumstances, this case is a $230m Russian tax fraud that has become a major source of international embarrassment for the Kremlin because of mounting evidence that prominent officials within the Interior Ministry, tax offices and the judiciary were involved.

Press-ganged

Rupeta says he fell foul of the Ukrainian money-launderers in 2007. But he has only now dared to speak up after the alleged ringleader of the group in Ukraine, banker Ruslan Demchak, was arrested on money-laundering charges in September 2012. In January , the National Bank of Ukraine withdrew the license of Demchak’s small lender RD Bank, which is now undergoing liquidation.

Demchak has said his arrest was politically motivated due to his decision to run as an independent candidate in the October parliamentary elections. His press secretary refuted all allegations of money-laundering and any involvement in bringing charges against Rupeta.

Rupeta says his troubles started when he stumbled across the money-laundering operation in late 2007. He says the gang, unknown to him, were using a bank account opened for the small firm where Rupeta held the post of director – with tens of millions of dollars pouring into the account, wired in instalments by a UK shell company from an account at Romanov’s Ukio Bankas.

But when a member of the gang died in a car crash in December 2007, the scheme also skidded off the road, because the widow inherited large amounts of money “belonging” to the money-launderers. Demchak came to Rupeta personally, relates Rupeta, and told him he would use his connections in law enforcement to fabricate a criminal case aimed at freezing the widow’s assets, and this would include bringing criminal charges against Rupeta as well, as director of a company involved in the scheme.

Sure enough, the Ukio Bankas client – Corpmark Impex LLP – filed a complaint to the police against Rupeta, and the police immediately brought charges. The complaint alleged Corpmark Impex, despite having signed no contract, had wired $6m to Rupeta’s firm as 100% advance payment on a shipment of granite he had promised to deliver, but then failed to.

Rupeta says he admires British justice as much as he does British football, but that Corpmark Impex LLP, registered in the sleepy Hertfordshire village of Elstree, snuggled between parish church and vicarage, may as well have been a resident of the murkiest Caribbean tax haven, such was its disregard of the law.

Experts agree. “It does look like the case was stitched up. The complaint itself is nonsense and facts cited have been clearly tortured to force the semblance of a criminal allegation,” says lawyer Valery Fedichin of Kyiv law firm OMP, who examined the complaint independently. “The pattern of payments looks instead like a classic money laundering scheme, using the Ukraine company as part of a complex scheme of shell companies,” says anti-money-laundering expert Saskia Rietbroek of AML Services International, who examined payment documents connected with the case.

The wheels of justice in Ukraine grind slowly but inexorably. Rupeta is expecting sentencing this year on charges of major fraud, which brings a prison sentence of 10-14 years. Ukraine courts convict in 95% of cases. This despite the fact that the mysterious Ukio Bankas client, Corpmark Impex, that brought the charges against Rupeta has since been dissolved. Demchak and his top managers – the people who Rupeta claims stitched him up – are themselves now in custody facing money-laundering charges. “I don’t know who was the mastermind behind the scheme – the Baltic banks or Ukrainians – but I believe Romanov might help if he wanted,” says Rupeta.

Romanov’s investment company Ūkio banko investicinė grupė (ŪBIG) had not responded to a request for comments at the time of going to press.

In and out…

Rupeta, a former bank manager, has had plenty of time during the years of legal proceedings to analyse what exactly had been going on. According to his enquiries, backed by documents seen by bne, the scheme functioned thus: Three non-resident shell companies – Corpmark Impex from the UK, Geraldic SA from Panama and Bridgemax Ltd from New Zealand – channelled hard currency funds to several small local Zhitomir firms, including Rupeta’s. Both the British company and the Panamanian company had accounts at Romanov’s Ukio Bankas, while the New Zealand company had an account at Latvia’s Trast Komercbanka.

The small local companies stood as guarantors for a $2m credit line at a local bank, held by the bank’s own head of foreign currency operations – the man killed in the car crash in December 2007. As the manager drew down the funds in cash apparently for his “personal needs”, the guarantor firms topped up the account using the funds they were receiving from abroad. The cash funds drawn down by the bank manager were then in fact distributed by road to the clients of the money-laundering platform.

In Ukraine such an operation is called a “conversion centre”. The term refers to the conversion of booked company funds to off-the-books cash. Companies wire payments under fictive contracts to firms run by the “conversion centre”, and get the money returned in cash, minus commission, on average 10%. The goal of the operation for its clients is tax evasion, by reducing profit tax through inflating company expenses while creating fraudulent VAT credit, and then using the cash received in return to pay salaries off the books, thus avoiding payroll taxes. As such, “conversion centre’ is often shortened to convert, the Ukrainian word for “envelope”, the medium for such payments. The total annual volume of the market in such “conversion” is around $7bn, according to an analysis by Ukraine’s security service SBU that was leaked to the press in 2010.

According to Vladimir Lysenko, professor at Ukraine’s national tax service university, “conversion centres are mostly directly organised by Ukrainian banks.” Baltic banks play a key role in such operations by circulating hard currency funds in and out of Ukraine via shell companies. According to Rupeta, a total of $57m in cash was transferred from the Baltic banks and paid out in cash via the scheme over a period of one and a half years. “The operation was completely illegal,” points out Rupeta, “since there were no foreign trade contracts to back the hard currency transfers from abroad, as is required by law.”

But the money-launderers’ contacts in law enforcement ensured a blind eye turned, alleges Rupeta.

Demchak’s scheme is not the only one where funds channelled from and to Ukio Bankas feature prominently. According to legal proceedings brought in 2012 in Ukraine, over the space of four months from September to December 2010, another New Zealand shell company, Anglo Stand Ltd, wired a breath-taking €100m and $30m to a small firm in Kharkiv, Ukraine from its bank account at Ukio Bankas. The funds were wired on the bizarre basis of an “agreement on non-refundable financial assistance” – ie. a generous Christmas present from the New Zealand firm to the Ukrainian. The director of the Kharkiv company then cashed the entire sum from its account at small regional bank Akta Bank, ostensibly for purchase of agriculture produce.

While court records only detail this single transaction, the scale of this operation may have been tenfold greater. According to documents leaked to the press by Ukrainian National Bank officials in 2010, the same small regional bank, Akta Bank, had already converted over $1bn of hard currency funds into cash between January and September 2010, making the total for 2010 close to $1.5bn. It is not clear how much of this total was transferred through Ukio Bankas.

According to Ukio Bankas, “As far as we know Ukrainian laws currently don’t include ‘tax crimes’ as a predicate offence [for money-laundering]. Ūkio bankas is neither claimant nor respondent in these cases.”

“We assure that Ūkio bankas strictly follows the law (including anti-money laundering laws) of the Republic of Lithuania and EU Directives in its everyday operations. The bank‘s operations are regularly supervised by the authoritative state institutions. We also cooperate with state law enforcement authorities as required,” Ukio Bankas added.

… and round about

There is also visibility on the reverse side of the operation – moving funds back out of Ukraine to the Baltics, and then on into the international financial system. In 2009, the head of Ukraine’s security service SBU accused another small Dnipropetrovsk bank, FS Bank, of hosting conversion centres that had moved over $2.5bn out of the country illegally in preceding years, including to Ukio Bankas.

According to the corresponding court case documents, between January 2007 and August 2008 three UK shell companies – Technoline Service, Winsboro and Dreamlux – wired over $1bn from their accounts in FS Bank to accounts at Ukio Bankas, Trast Komercbanka and Kyrgyzstan’s Asia Universal Bank – the latter a bank that Kyrgyz authorities nationalised in 2010 due to money-laundering suspicions and balance sheet holes.

The UK companies declared the funds to be the repatriation of investments. The “repatriation of investment”, however, came from the sale at face value of what in fact were worthless local securities – a notorious scam for shifting funds from one company to the next. The securities were sold to a cluster of other UK, US and Ukrainian companies all with accounts at FS Bank, where it is to be assumed the wired payments from clients of the conversion centres had accumulated.

What happens to the dirty Ukrainian funds after reaching the Baltics? Luckily in 2010 the Belgian Financial Intelligence Processing Unit (CTIF), Belgium’s anti-money-laundering watchdog, flagged up suspicious money flows that had passed through a “Belgium bank” from a “East European” bank. Two respected Belgian media outlets quoted sources in CTIF that the banks in question were Belgium’s ING and Lithuania’s Ukio Bankas. Ukio Bankas in turn confirmed at the time that it had been queried about the payments.

According to the CTIF report, the “East European bank” had two accounts at the Belgium bank for correspondent banking. “They were used to transfer money from various offshore companies, customers of this bank, to various counter parties across the world.” Around €1.4bn was transferred via the correspondent accounts in 2008-2009 to a variety of tax havens across the world, in an operation involving a total of 475 shell companies.

“There was little or no information available on the articles of association or these companies‟ activities… CTIF’s analysis showed that several of these companies were known for serious and organised tax fraud, corruption, embezzlement, fraud and organised crime,” reads the report.

The money was transferred in such a way using a series of intermediary companies and alternately regrouping and splitting the funds to make it difficult for the bank in Belgium to determine their origin. “The bank made sure they could conceal the nature of the money,” concludes the report.

From grey to black

The phenomenon of conversion centres may account for the bulk of the dirty money between Ukraine and Baltic banks on an annual basis. Tax evasion sounds a victimless crime, considering the high tax rates and bureaucracy in Ukraine. But the enormous grey international financial flows generated create a channel perfect for laundering the proceeds of crime and corruption.

Moreover, on a local level the work of conversion centres involves billions of dollars in cash buzzing around Ukraine’s pot-holed roads – and none of it recoverable by legal means. This makes their activity the preserve of serious organised crime. And given the improved technologies at the disposal of Ukraine’s tax police, none of this would be possible if law enforcement agencies were not paid off or cut in. Thus conversion centres are a key intersection of the state and mafia.

A number of high-profile contract killings are also linked to the work of conversion centres, such as the savage slaying in 2006 of top cop Roman Erokhin, who was tasked with cracking down on conversion centres by former prime minister Yulia Tymoshenko. But such killings may be only the tip of the iceberg of routine violence and intimidation – as is indicated by Anatoly Rupeta’s case.



Moldova’s political crisis crippling race to save key bank

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Graham Stack in Berlin
February 19, 2013

Embezzlement on a massive scale uncovered at Moldova’s state-owned savings bank means it will go under by end of March unless decisive action is taken, according to a leaked International Monetary Fund (IMF) report. But political feuding in the governing coalition exploded into open warfare during the week of February 11, minimising the chances of a timely solution.

“The financial situation at the Banca de Economii a Moldovei (BEM) has been deteriorating since mid-2009, as a consequence of apparently fraudulent lending,” reads the apparent rough draft of a report by the IMF filed in January and subsequently leaked to the press and internet. “In fact, if the National Bank of Moldova had not relaxed its provisions for seized assets 1 December 2012, BEM would have already become insolvent and its licence withdrawn… On the basis of subsequent significant provisions and with lack of recovery of major non-performing loans or seized assets or an injection of capital, it is expected that BEM will become insolvent by March 31, 2013.”

A letter also leaked to the press in early February detailing an interim audit by Grant Thornton found that at the end of September 2012, BEM had been in violation of national bank regulations concerning minimum capital requirements, risk-weighted capital adequacy, the ratio of the ten largest borrowers to the total loan portfolio, net exposure to a group of people acting in concert, and the sum of all large exposures.

Both the IMF and Grant Thornton have refused to deny or confirm the authenticity of the leaked documents.

Raport-Grant-Thornton Raport-FMI-Partea-1 Raport-FMI-Partea-2

Social bank

BEM is only Moldova’s sixth largest bank by assets, holding around 13% of total deposits, but its key position in Moldova’s banking system is its monopoly on paying out pensions and other social payments, thanks to its majority state ownership and extensive network of branches, particularly those in villages where a majority of inhabitants live. BEM also holds the deposits of almost all public agencies and institutions, such as hospitals and schools, with a total of MDL707m (€43.65m) in insured deposits, while the state’s deposit guarantee fund contains a total of only MDL134m, reads the leaked IMF report.

This makes it a disaster that the bank has been the centre of massive embezzlement over the last three years, which now threatens to drag it under.

According its declared results for 2012, the bank lost around $25m in 2012 due to provisions for non-performing loans, a huge sum for a Moldovan bank, with the bank’s problems resulting from criminal fraud. And Grant Thornton wrote in December that its discovery of systematic fraud at the bank from 2009-2012 meant it was pointless to continue its audit. The auditors detailed one example of obviously fraudulent loans, just under €10m paid to Moldovan companies that had been secured by fake real estate. The funds were then transferred to accounts offshore. “There is a large probability that there are more such transactions,” read the accountant’s report.

The IMF in its report spoke of the “omnipresent activity of fraudulent crediting” at the bank, implying involvement of all departments of the state-owned bank, and that despite a change in top management at the bank in April 2012, many implicated in the fraud remain in their old positions.

A final straw for the authorities has been growing evidence the bank was used to launder funds embezzled from the Russian budget in the so-called “Magnitsky case”. On February 11, Moldova became the sixth country to launch a probe into the notorious $230m fraud case that involved the death of anti-corruption lawyer Sergei Magnitsky while in Russian custody. Switzerland, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are conducting similar investigations, while the US Congress last year adopted the Magnitsky Act, which imposed asset freezes and barred from entry to the US anyone suspected of a role in his death.

According to the IMF report – apparently penned by David C. Parker, an expert on closing down defunct banks – there are now two options facing Moldova’s financial authorities, one of which must be taken in the coming weeks: either Moldova creates a bridge bank or it recapitalises BEM.

The report says both options “would require significant state funds calling for an amendment of the budget.” But, crucially, the bank is only 66% owned by the state, so a capital injection could either see public money benefitting murky private interests, or in the event of diluting the private owners, the certainty of legal action against the move. And given that no one understands the extent of the bank’s losses, “this would be a classic example of sending good money after bad,” warns the report, which comes down on the side of setting up a bridge bank.

Political crisis

Yet Moldovan politics is the last place to turn for a swift solution to a banking crisis, because one party in the governing Alliance for European Integration – the Democratic Party – is widely viewed as a pocket party of the very oligarch accused by opponents of the looting of BEM and numerous other banks.

The coalition’s majority is dependent on the small Democrat Party and this kingmaker position has allowed the party to take control of the crucial law-enforcement offices of General Prosecutor and the Anti-corruption Office. The Democratic Party’s financial backer is its deputy head, reputedly Moldova’s richest man, MP Vlad Plahotniuc, who also has great media clout thanks to his ownership of TV channels.

Thus the growing crisis at BEM has also plunged the coalition into crisis. “Today we witness a campaign of sacrificing the interests of the state in the name of the interests one of single shadowy person, who has purchased a place in politics and now wants to buy the country,” Prime Minister Vlad Filat raged in a TV address on February 13, announcing he was taking his Liberal Democratic Party (PLDM) out of the coalition agreement. “For him notions such as rule of law, democracy, European integration and welfare of citizens are words without meaning… I tell you I am not interested in one individual or another or their identities: I am concerned about the criminal system they have set up.”

And so the unbelievable occurred: Filat’s party entered into talks with its archenemies, the opposition Communist Party of Moldova. As a result, the two largest parties in parliament voted together at the opening session of the Parliament on February 15 to abolish the post of first deputy speaker of parliament – held by Plahotniuc – which then duly occurred, with the second coalition partner, the Liberal Party, abstaining from the vote.

Plahotniuc was not lost for an answer. In the same week, the National Anti-corruption Centre, the head of which was appointed on the quota of the Democratic Party, announced investigations against three Filat allies in the government – the finance minister, health minister and culture minister. On February 15, the day of the crucial vote on abolishing Plahotniuc’s state post, anti-corruption officers in a glare of publicity picked up and charged the head of the tax service, and also raided government buildings as part of the purported anti-corruption campaign.

The official reason for the outbreak of hostilities between the two former allies is the so-called “Huntgate” scandal: a Christmas shooting party held in a nature reserve and involving top officials such as the former General Prosecutor, a Plahotniuc appointee called Valeriu Zubco, who managed to inadvertently shoot one of their own number, young businessman Sorin Paciu. The bigwigs then tried to unsuccessfully hush up the affair, and the ensuing scandal allowed Filat to push successfully for Zubco’s resignation in January – seen as a blow against Plahotniuc’s power.

A first sign of Plathoniuc’s weakening grip on the General Prosecutor’s office was the announcement of charges against former BEM manager Grigore Gacikevici for fraud on February 8. Gacikeviki was removed from the bank in April 2012. And the real context for Filat finally turning on Plahotniuc after three years of tolerating his activities may have been the emergency at state-owned BEM and other banks.

Plahotniuc’s critics have alleged, and gathered some damning proof, that the oligarch has been raiding Moldova’s banking system with impunity over the last three years, protected by his control of prosecutor and anti-corruption offices, and aided by his influence over the economic bloc of the government and the National Bank of Moldova.

While there is no documented link between Plahotniuc and the fraud at BEM specifically, the bank figured in 2010 and 2011 as one of a group of banks where minority share packets were expropriated by dodgy court decisions in Moldova, and transferred to non-resident companies, chiefly in the UK. In the case of one of the other banks affected, Victoria Bank, litigation in London subsequently established that Plahotniuc was now the beneficiary owner of the UK shell company owning the share packet. Plahotniuc says that the UK documents bearing his name are forgeries. Large outflows of funds seem to have taken place from the banks subsequent to the “raids”.

Paradoxically, however, it seems the seriousness of the situation at BEM is such that Filat and his government allies are in fact denying there is an emergency there, to avoid a run on the bank that could spell disaster for the entire fragile economy. Plahotniuc’s party and media, conversely, are hyping the situation around BEM, ran the leaked IMF reports and audit, and are calling for a parliamentary enquiry. This even prompted Filat in his address to the nation to talk of a “dirty campaign” being waged against the bank, created in order to distract attention from “Huntgate”. In a TV interview, Filat said he had never seen the IMF report.

Filat is thus in the unenviable position of having to publicly whitewash the BEM emergency, a fact that Plahotniuc seems to be using to pin the blame on Filat, thus blackmailing the government over a fraud situation he may himself be suspected of creating.

Meanwhile, the future of the governing coalition going into the new parliamentary session looks very black, following the joint agreement between Communists and Filat’s Liberal Democrats last week. Filat has called for the coalition agreement to be renegotiated, but may be forced to try and muddle through with a minority government to avoid pre-term elections. His biggest trump card is the high level of support from the EU and international financial institutions, who have been talking Moldova up as a reform success story and moving swiftly towards the signing of an association agreement. Filat discussed the political crisis with the EU’s commissioner for expansion, Stefan Fule, and Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk on February 14 by telephone, according to newswires.

But Plahotniuc could also claim some sort of international support on February 15 in his appearance in parliament: brandishing papers he said were confirmation from Italy’s Interpol bureau that he was not under investigation as a member of an organized crime group, as leaked documents and statements by the interior minister had suggested.


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Controversial oligarch retains political power in new Moldovan govt

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Graham Stack in Kyiv for Business New Europe, May 30

 

Moldova’s richest man Vlad Plahotniuc, who has been linked in court documents to dodgy activities at the country’s banks, has retained his power base in a new government coalition formed May 30, just as the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) made fresh accusations of shareholder illegal corporate raids on the country’s largest bank. 

Moldova’s Liberal Democratic Party, the Democratic Party and a splinter group from the Liberal Party have signed up to “a pro-European coalition” that will form a new government, after the previous coalition collapsed on March 8. Iurie Leanca, a Liberal Democrat politician, will be prime minister. Former PM Vlad Filat, leader of the Liberal Democrats, the largest party in the coalition, had been banned from serving again as premier by Moldova’s Constitutional Court. The coalition will now have a wafer-thin majority of 53 mandates in the 101-member unicameral parliament. 

The new coalition government will be seen as a victory for controversial oligarch Vladimir Plahotniuc, who funds and runs the Democratic Party. Only weeks ago, he and his party were at loggerheads with Filat and the Liberal Democrats, with mutual accusations of corruption escalating into raids by competing law enforcement organs. This ultimately led to the collapse of the government in March, leaving parties scrabbling around for new partners to try to form a government. 

However, Filat apparently failed to find any alternative to a coalition with Plahnotniuc’s Democratic Party, after flirting with idea of a minority government. Now Plahotniuc’s Democrat Party seems set to retain control of the economic block in the government – the ministries for transport, telecommunications and construction, and the post of deputy prime minister for economy – the crucial offices of prosecutor general and anti-corruption prosecutor, as well as holding influence over the courts and central bank. Plahotniuc’s opponents say he has used his political power ruthlessly for his own ends, in addition to the power he derives from his ownership of two TV channels and immense financial resources. 

According to Nicu Popescu, foreign policy advisor to the prime minister, the big plus to the new coalition is that political stability has returned. “After five months of infighting, the government can return to the work of reforms moving towards an association agreement with the European Union,” he tells bne. “Hopefully there will also be a de-politicisation of law enforcement and that institutions intended to combat corruption will start to act independently of politicians.” 

Bank holdup 

However events parallel to the announcement of the new government cast doubt on any change for the better. 

On May 28, the country’s largest bank Moldova Agroindbank (MAIB) and the EBRD, which uses the bank to funnel project funding, levelled fresh accusations of dirty dealings in the country’s banking sector. MAIB declared in a press release that, starting February 2013, the bank, its organs and shareholders have become the target of new fraudulent actions, “backed by individuals who hold positions of responsibility in the state (administrative and judiciary)… The scale and odious nature of these fraudulent actions are sufficient to undermine the financial stability of the bank and of the country.” 

Moldova’s banking sector has been rocked by a series of such illegal corporate raids since 2011. Such an attack usually entails transfer of the ownership of shares without knowledge of the original owners to shell companies abroad, by means of legal skulduggery such as crooked court decisions and share depository manipulations. 

MAIB accounts for around 20% of Moldova’s banking assets, lending and deposits. It is the main recipient of EBRD funding in Moldova, with a minority stake held by a pool of Slovenian investors since 2006 (bank management hold 33%, portfolio investors 23%, private individuals 11% and treasury stock 7%). 

The National Bank of Moldova shed more light on what had happened: in three successive waves in late March, mid-April and mid-May, a total of 24.85% of MAIB’s shares had mysteriously changed hands, including May 14-18 the 18.2% stake held by a pool of foreign investors linked to Slovenia’s Factorbank, the largest foreign investment in Moldova’s banking system to date. Seven foreign companies registered in the UK, Cyprus and Latvia acquired the shares, and since each packet was under the 5% threshold and no common owner of the acquiring foreign companies declared, there was no application made for central bank approval of the transaction. 

The exact mechanics of the transfer of shares are not clear, but MAIB is blaming a share depository that was implicated in a previous raider attack, that time on Victoriabank, having illegally transferred ownership of the shares. “If sufficient evidence points to a significant stake in the bank having been acquired (by one party), we will suspend the rights of the shareholders,” the National Bank promised. 

But the National Bank has done little in previous instances to prevent such attacks. Already in late April, the EBRD wrote to Moldovan authorities warning of the ongoing machinations, according to an EBRD letter leaked to media, authenticity of which was confirmed to bne. In the letter, the EBRD noted the “suspicious nature” of the transactions, saying they looked like a repeat of an attempted expropriation of MAIB shareholders in 2011. “Moldova-Agroindbank is our largest partner bank in Moldova, and we are monitoring the situation very closely,” the EBRD tells bne

That 2011 raid on the MAIB’s shareholders was at the time beaten back by the combined efforts of the European diplomatic community, and finally reversed by a Moldovan Supreme Court decision. But this time round, the EBRD’s warning to Moldova in April was apparently not enough to prevent the attacks continuing in May. 

The attack on MAIB in 2011 was in fact the only such corporate raid in Moldova’s financial sector to have been reversed to date. The expropriation of stakes at other banks and insurance companies proved successful. A court case brought in London by apparently expropriated shareholders in Victoriabank, businessmen Victor and Viorel Topa, revealed that their stake in the bank had been transferred to a UK company, the owner of which was none other than Vladimir Plahotniuc, according to a court discovery order. 

Plahotniuc’s press secretary earlier denied to bne any connection to the “raid” and said the documents produced by the discovery order in London had been forged. 

According to the Topa brothers, there were subsequently large capital outflows from Victoriabank in the form of tens of millions of dollars worth of loans made to offshores. In late 2012, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) expressed alarm at the situation in another bank targeted by corporate raiders, state savings bank Banca de Economii. According to the IMF and independent auditors, tens of millions of dollars in unrecoverable loans made to offshores had brought the bank to the brink of collapse. The political crisis has paralysed attempts to recapitalise the bank. 

Powerbroker 

Plahotniuc’s role as kingmaker in the governing coalition left then-PM Vlad Filat powerless to stop the raiding of the country’s banks. Only in early 2013 did Filat brave the collapse of the coalition to stop the oligarch’s alleged shenanigans, when he used a scandal around a New Year’s shooting party where a man died to remove Plahotniuc placemen like the prosecutor general, Valeriu Zubco, and the subsequent arrest of the former CEO of Banca de Economii. A temporary alliance between Filat’s Liberal Democrat Party and the opposition Communist Party abolished Plahotniuc’s post of first deputy speaker. 

But Plahotniuc fought back hard: the Anti-Corruption Office raised corruption allegations against Filat and his party colleagues, and the coalition collapsed weeks before it was due to sign a breakthrough Association Agreement with the EU, with the government resigning on March 8 after a vote of no-confidence in the parliament on March 5. 

In April, in a bid to stave off pre-term elections, Filat attempted to renew the alliance with Plahotniuc’s Democratic Party, again conceding control to Plahotniuc of the crucial Prosecutor General and Anti-Corruption posts. But making a mockery of such concessions, the Constitutional Court ruled April 22 that Filat himself could not return as prime minister, due to the allegations of corruption against his government raised by the Anti-Corruption Office, a decision strongly favourable to Plahotniuc. 

Now Plahotniuc seems to have come out of the power struggle stronger than ever – and the litmus test of his new power may be whether the corporate raids on MAIB succeeds this time, where it was reversed in 2011. “The raider attacks are an attempt to seize and concentrate property. The next step will to legitimate it. It is a real risk not only for the market economy, but also for democracy,” Tatyana Laryshin of Moldovan think-tank Viitorul tells bne


Lukashenko linked to Belarusian fuel trader

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Graham Stack for Business New Europe in Minsk

July 5, 2013

A leaked database of British Virgin Islands (BVI) companies links President Alexander Lukashenko to one of the largest private fortunes in Belarus, that of the shadowy oil trader Nikolai Vorobei.

Belarus’ state-dominated economy is not “offshore” like Russia and Ukraine – because it remains mostly state-owned. Thus the database, which was leaked to the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists amidst no little publicity, contains only 19 with Belarus addresses. Further than that, only one comes with a director’s name attached, those scant details suffice to link Lukashenko to Vorobei.

The telltale BVI offshore is Interforest Corp, registered in 1998 under director Alexander Metla at a Minsk address. bne spoke to residents at V.Horyzhej 16, who confirmed that the man in question is Alexander Mikhailovich Metla, the well-known head of the Pamyat’ Afgana charity for Afghan veterans.

bne contacted Metla directly, who acknowledged that the company had been registered under his address. Metla said however that he knew nothing about the firm and that his name and address had obviously been used by a third party without his knowledge.

Good neighbours

However, Metla apparently fronted for Belarus officials in one prominent case shortly after the BVI company was established. In 1998, when Interforest Corp was set up, no one had heard of Metla, but he made his public debut just a year later in a court case pitting the country’s top policeman against an investigative journalist: a libel suit brought by Viktor Sheiman – the feared interior minister and secretary of the national security council – against journalist Sergei Anisko. Anisko had written an article describing what he said was a country residence being built by Sheiman at his parents’ dacha in Podlipki, west of Minsk.

In the hearings, Metla testified that the sprawling new property under construction adjacent to Sheiman’s parents’ dacha belonged to him. As a result the judge awarded crippling damages against Anisko and the newspaper that published his piece.

During the proceedings, however, it transpired that Metla had served side-by-side with Sheiman in Soviet Army operations in Afghanistan in the 1980s, and the pair were close friends. Sheiman was head of the Belarus police, Metla a humble deputy director of a no-name firm. The huge new property was next door to Sheiman’s parents’ house but on paper Metla indeed owned the mansion. “Metla was and is Sheiman’s man, not an independent player,” Anisko claims to bne. Metla did not comment on the case.

Metla’s subsequent career points to the same. Working in Sheiman’s shadow, he has achieved prominence as director of Pamyat Afghana. Founded 2002, the charity boasts Sheiman as a member of the supervisory board. It is also personally patronized by Lukashenko and enjoys generous tax benefits.

Ironically for the director of a BVI company – and unusually, even in proudly pro-Soviet Belarus – Metla is an openly avid fan of Stalin. He even founded “The Stalin Line” theme park, which recreates a World War II battleground in Belarus. However, the links between Stalinist military glory and offshore practices may not be so incongruous in reality as they appear. Afghan veterans and Belarusian import-export operations were closely linked in the 1990s, when the state supported veterans’ associations with excise tax exemptions, making them an important commercial channel, according to Anisko.

Joining the dots

Metla’s apparent fronting for Sheiman highlights the relationship between the Lukashenko regime and Belarus’ shadowy, but lucrative, private sector. Interforest Corp is linked to a prominent timber firm: Joint Venture Interforest, based in Novopolotsk in the north of Belarus, and founded in 1999, according to the Belaspravka online register. Under Belarusian legislation, as a joint venture, it must have a foreign shareholder. The company told bne that it has an investor from “Western Europe”, but declined to name either the investor or the country of origin. Metla’s Interforest Corp was founded just one year before the Belarusian Interforest JV, suggesting the BVI offshore may have played the role of “foreign investor”. The leaked BVI data are valid up to 2010.

Metla denied any connection to the Belarus JV ‘Interforest’.

Belarus does not have a publicly accessible register of company ownership, but according to the Orbis Business intelligence database, the Belarus shareholder in JV Interforest is OOO Avtoimport, also based in Novopolotsk. The database does not contain information on the foreign shareholders.

OOO Avtoimport is a car importer established in the 1990s by powerful Novopolotsk businessman Nikolai Vorobei, one of Belarus’ richest men. Vorobei’s core business since the 1990s is oil and fuel trading via OOO Interservis. His home town is situated on the crucial Druzhba oil pipeline – the mainline carrying Russian crude into Europe. Novopolotsk also hosts the flagship state-owned Polymir refinery, part of the giant state-owned Belneftekhim petrochemicals holding.

Interservis has been one of Belarus’ two largest private fuel traders since for a large part of the last two decades, according to media reports. The relationship between the company’s private oil product trading and the state-owned refinery has fuelled much speculation over the years.

Vorobei, of whom no photos exist and who has never given an interview, did not respond to attempts to contact him. He is clearly connected to the very upper echelons of power however. In 2012, Interservis business practices even prompted a bust-up with Russia.

Within the remit of the forming Customs Union – which now groups Belarus, Russia and Kazakhstan under free trade rules – starting in 2010, Belarus was granted the right to import Russian crude for its refineries free of export duties. However, should the resulting oil products be subsequently exported outside the Customs Union, the traders are required to stump up the bypassed levies to the Russian budget.

Belarusian exports of oil-based solvents and diluents – which do not trigger the export duty payments – promptly soared tenfold or so in 2011-2012 – with Interservis the main exporter, according to media reports. Russia is crying foul, alleging false classification of exports.

“We suspect that this product is a fraud: I cannot rule out that oil products are being exported under the cover of diluents,” Russia’s tax tsar Sergei Shatalov said last year. In April, Russia’s ambassador in Belarus said that the scheme had finally been wound up, with losses to the Russian budget estimated at around $1.5bn.

Despite Russia’s huge leverage over Belarus, Moscow’s protests over its practices have done little to stem the rapid expansion of Interservis. In 2012, the company privatised Belarus’ largest bitumen producer, launched construction of a new $270m oil refinery in Novopolotsk, and in January this year bought a controlling stake in Amkodor, Belarus’ leading producer of road-building equipment. Such frenzied M&A makes Interservis the “fastest expanding holding in Belarus”, claims Yaroslav Romanchuk, head of the Mises research center and an opposition presidential candidate in 2010. He estimates Vorobei to be the country’s fifth richest man with assets worth over $2.5bn.

All the president’s men

The pyramid climbs higher then. While Metla is Sheiman’s sidekick, Sheiman – appointed head of the President’s Property Administration (in other words in control of all state assets) earlier this year – in turn is Lukashenko’s trusted henchman of twenty years’ standing. The BVI connection to Vorobei’s business in the 1990s – during Sheiman’s five year stint as interior minister – suggests Sheiman acted as “krysha” (directly translated as “roof”, but meaning a protector from the law and other predators) to Belarus’ shadowy but lucrative private export-import business. Sheiman’s loyalty to Lukashenko suggests that he in turn may have been acting in the name of the president.

Sheiman is generally regarded as the “enforcer” among Lukashenko’s entourage. Opposition activists allege he was responsible for the disappearance – presumed murder – of a number of leading opposition politicians in 1999, mostly notably former interior minister Yury Zakarenko. Leaked US diplomatic dispatches – calling Sheiman an “odious” figure, and also linking him to the disappearances in 1999 – quote sources that put his personal wealth at $397m in 2006. Sheiman, like many top Lukashenko officials is banned from travelling to the EU or USA.

The Metla-Sheiman-Lukashenko link could for the first time offer a glimpse of documentation of the Lukashenko regime’s involvement in Belarus’ shadowy private sector. “Lukashenko has always been very careful never to leave any paper trail regarding property and money flows,” says Romanchuk, “it has never been possible to prove anything.”


Usual suspects figure as laundries of dirty Russian money

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July 15 in Minsk for Business New Europe (www.bne.eu)

The head of Russia’s central bank said earlier this year that billions left the country illegally in 2012. However,bne can reveal that the National Bank of Belarus is claiming huge amounts of dirty money have been flowing out of Russia to be laundered in banks across Asia and CEE in a scheme existing since 2009.

Sergei Ignatiev, the former governor of the Central Bank of Russia (CBR) revealed in February – towards the end of his 12-year tenure – that $50bn had been illegally moved out of Russia in 2012. Shell companies, he said, routed the money as payment for bogus import contracts.

Indeed, half of this sum, the CBR chief said, was the work of one interconnected “platform” of companies, apparently set up by a single group of money launderers. “You get the impression that they are all controlled by one well organized group of people,” Ignatiev said, in an interview with business daily Vedomosti. “With a serious concentration of efforts by law enforcement agencies, I think it is possible to find these people.”

Later, addressing the State Duma, Ignatiev detailed the workings of this platform, which he said accounted for $25bn of the total illegal capital export last year. The cash was transferred to foreign bank accounts as payment on bogus imports from Belarus ($15bn) and Kazakhstan ($10bn), fellow members of the Customs Union – the funds likely the fruits of tax evasion, drugs and bribery.

In June, there were reports of a criminal investigation into All-Russian Regional Development Bank for illegal transfers of nearly $1bn in 2011-12, the payments apparently made for fictive imports from Belarus. Intriguingly, the bank is controlled by state-owned oil giant Rosneft.

According to the letter circulated by National Bank of Belarus (NBR) and seen by bne, the scam actually started as early as 2009 – a year before the Customs Union between Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan was launched. The first countermeasures were attempted in 2010, according to the NBR, and letters issued by the Russian Central Bank in 2010 and 2011 on procedures for verifying Belarus exporters confirm concern on the Russian side at the time. However, Ignatiev’s comments suggest Russian law-enforcement took little or no actual action to halt the illegal capital export, which points to the scheme being protected from somewhere on high.

Unsurprisingly, the NBR letter insists that the scheme in no way actually involved Belarus. Rather, it says, the money launderers set up Belarusian shell companies solely for the purpose of issuing waybills for goods purportedly shipped to Russia. They then present these papers on behalf of Russian shell companies to Russian banks in order to wire funds in payment.

Crucially, the Belarus firms have bank accounts not in Belarus but in jurisdictions from where the money can percolate into the international financial system. According to the NBR letter, real Belarus firms in fact require special individual permission from the NBR to open foreign bank accounts, and thus Belarus cannot be blamed for the scheme. Hence, according to the NBR’s argument, it is a purely Russian affair, and none of the funds actually passed through Belarus.

Usual suspects

According to the NBR letter, the foreign banks through which the illegal funds flowed out of Russia were located in Cyprus, Latvia, Estonia, Kyrgyzstan, Hong Kong and Turkey.

That again appears to confirm the central role of Cyprus for laundering Russian money, an issue flagged by Brussels this year by its controversial bailout terms for the island’s secretive and swollen banking sector. That resulted in a severe haircut for all depositors with over €100,000 in their accounts.

According to a leaked May 2013 audit of 390 customers at the six Cypriot banks by Deloitte and the European Council’s anti-money laundering watchdog MONEYVAL, “systematic deficiencies in the implementation of preventive measures” and a “cumulative level of inherent risk beyond a level that is capable of being effectively mitigated” was found. While the banks had reported a mere handful of suspicious transactions between 2008 and 2012, Deloitte identified 29 in just the previous 12 months. Meanwhile, 10% of customers were “politically-exposed persons” who had not been identified as such.

Suspicion has also long hovered over Latvia’s banks for much the same reasons, and it has only raised since the Cypriot meltdown in August, as fleeing cash seeks a new home. A chunk of the $480bn fraudulent tax rebate funds flagged up by deceased whistleblower Sergei Magnitsky moved through Latvia, according to an investigation by lawyers Brown Rudnick. Kyrgyz banks entered the money-laundering market around 2008, in close cahoots with their Latvian peers, according to a Global Witness investigation. However, since the 2010 revolution ousted then-president Kurmanbek Bakiyev, and led to nationalisation of the notorious Asia Universal bank, it seems to have lost its role.

Estonia is apparently the new kid on the money-laundering block, meaning there’s little indication of the volume of funds moving through the Eurozone member. The most prominent case of dirty funds moving through the smallest of the Baltics was the case of an Ilyushin jet intercepted at Bangkok Airport in December 2009. The plane was found stuffed with weapons en route from North Korea to Iran, and was leased by a New Zealand shell company with an account at Estonia’s Sampo Bank, according to an International Peace Information Service investigation.

In contrast to the other jurisdictions through which the dirty Russian funds have been moving, Hong Kong and Turkey have no Soviet links and may point to new channels being developed. With the problems experienced by Cyprus resulting in heightened attention in the Eurozone to the risks from member states laundering Russian money, that’s not too surprising.


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